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
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

On self discovery and self responsibility: An interview with Nathaniel Branden

INTRODUCTION

In our Special Issue of October 1971, REASON published our first interview with Nathaniel Branden—a comprehensive, candid discussion which covered a broad range of topics. The response by our readers was overwhelmingly enthusiastic. We are now pleased to present a second interview, in which we invited Dr. Branden to share with us some of his thinking on aspects of psychology and psychotherapy not covered in his previous writing.

Nathaniel Branden is a name familiar to libertarians. Born in Brampton, Ontario in 1930, he studied psychology at UCLA and NYU. In 1951, he met Ayn Rand and began a long association with her that lasted until 1968, when their friendship ended in a bitter personal conflict. During the 1960's, Dr. Branden founded and directed the Nathaniel Branden Institute (N.B.I.), a lecture organization devoted to the dissemination of Objectivism, the name given by Ms. Rand to her philosophical system.

In addition to his lecture activities at N.B.I., Nathaniel Branden was co-founder and co-editor, with Ayn Rand, of THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER (later called THE OBJECTIVIST), from 1962 to 1968. It was in this journal that his articles on philosophy and psychology first appeared. Aside from their striking originality, his psychological theories were remarkable for their integration with philosophy. Keenly aware of the importance of philosophy, Dr. Branden continually emphasized the necessity of a sound philosophical basis for any theory of human psychology.

After the dissolution of N.B.I. in 1968, Nathaniel Branden moved from New York City to Los Angeles, where he resumed his practice as a psychotherapist. In addition, he lectured for a year at the USC School of Philosophy on the philosophical foundations of the biological and psychological sciences. In 1969, he published THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-ESTEEM (Nash Publishing Co.), a major theoretical work that is perhaps best described as a treatise on philosophical psychology. With a major emphasis on his biocentric, or life-centered, approach to psychology, Dr. Branden systematically discussed a wide variety of topics—from epistemology, causality and volition, to psychology as a science, the nature of consciousness, romantic love and emotional repression.

As indicated by its title, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-ESTEEM developed the thesis that self-esteem is a fundamental psychological need of man. A specific application of this theme was presented in Dr. Branden's next book, BREAKING FREE, (Nash 1970), which illustrated, through transcripts of dramatic case histories, how childhood experiences often contribute to a negative self-concept and thereby hinder the development of one's self-esteem.

In his latest book, THE DISOWNED SELF (Nash 1971), Dr. Branden addresses himself to the problem of self-

alienation, a condition in which a person "disowns" certain aspects of his personality and thus becomes oblivious to his real needs, desires and emotions. It is in this book that one can observe most clearly how Dr. Branden's abstract theories apply to his day-to-day work as a psychotherapist. THE DISOWNED SELF is a blend of theory and practice, where psychological problems are considered in terms of their practical causes, effects and solutions, as well as in terms of their wider implications for psychological theory.

Although Dr. Branden devotes most of his time to writing and psychotherapy, he takes an active interest in libertarianism. In addition to keeping abreast of libertarian journals, he has been a featured speaker at a number of recent libertarian conferences. And it is not uncommon to find him discussing, in his spare time, such issues as victimless crimes, limited government vs. anarchy, the role of American foreign policy, and the state of the libertarian movement.

REASON's interview with Dr. Branden was conducted by George H. Smith, author of the recent book ATHEISM: THE CASE AGAINST GOD (Nash Publishing Co.). Smith, who is also associate editor of BOOK NEWS (Academic Associates) and co-editor of INVICTUS, was assisted by R.A. Childs, Jr. and REASON associate editor Tibor Machan. The interview was done in two parts, each of which lasted nearly three hours. After reviewing the edited transcript, Dr. Branden gave it his approval.

REASON: In reading *THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-ESTEEM, BREAKING FREE* and *THE DISOWNED SELF,* one is struck by how different each of these books is, in abstract level, in approach, and so forth. How do you see their relationship to one another?

BRANDEN: *THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-ESTEEM* is, of course, the most theoretical and the most comprehensive in the subject it treats. In it, I attempted to lay the foundation of my way of thinking about psychology.

Today, my understanding has gone considerably beyond what I said in that book, but it still functions as my basic frame of reference. I tend to define my more recent identifications in relation to the views expressed there, as extensions of those views, or new applications, or modifications, or corrections.

BREAKING FREE is a different kind of book entirely. I think of it as an exercise, an experiment. As you know, it consists almost entirely of edited transcripts of therapy sessions. So much has been written about child-parent relations, but I wanted in that book to capture the child's perspective and experience in the words of the clients themselves—in effect, to let them tell their own stories—to tell how it was for them—and also to show how this infor-

mation was elicited—and thereby to disclose how parents contribute to neurosis, to the formation of negative self-concepts, to the undermining of a child's self-esteem. My purpose was not to blame parents, or to deny the individual's responsibility for his own life, but to illuminate what happens in early child-parent transactions. The book is thus intended to be a help to self-understanding, as well as a warning to parents.

REASON: You don't deal with childhood very much in *THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-ESTEEM.*

BRANDEN: That's right. At the time of writing the book, I recognized that childhood is where almost all neurotic problems begin, but that's not what I focused on. My focus was more on the present, just as it used to be, in earlier years, when doing psychotherapy.

But more recently, several years ago, I found myself compelled to plunge deeper into childhood experiences, in the course of working with clients, and then to work to integrate those experiences with the present. I found I achieved better results that way. And that shift of focus is expressed in *BREAKING FREE.* During the past several years, I have become far more interested in childhood.

As to *THE DISOWNED SELF,* I really regard it as a sequel to *THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-ESTEEM.* The important breakthrough for me in that book was the treatment of the relationship of reason and emotion. I see this as a significant advance over my earlier approach.

Psychologists who emphasize the intellect, cognition, reason, tend to take a disparaging attitude toward emotions, though few of them will admit it. Often their attitude is implicit rather than explicit. Psychologists who emphasize emotions, and specialize in emotional-release types of therapy, tend to be hostile to reason and the intellect—though, again, few of them will admit it. I reached a point where I saw that a new integration was necessary. I wanted, in *THE DISOWNED SELF,* to provide that integration—to show a better way of thinking about the relationship of reason and emotion.

Now, the desirability of achieving such an integration is not arguable. The question is: How is it to be done? How does one implement it? That is what I wanted to answer in *THE DISOWNED SELF.*

Explicitly, of course, the theme of the book is the problem of self-alienation—the state that results when an individual represses and disowns certain of his needs, feelings, desires, hurts, frustrations, fears, longings, and so forth. That problem is the vehicle through which the issue of reason and emotion is explored.

REASON: Is there any connecting link that unites the three books?

BRANDEN: The three books are united by their concern with self-esteem. They may all be viewed as variations on the theme of self-esteem. They deal, in different ways and from different perspectives, with the conditions necessary for the attainment of self-esteem, the factors that result in the undermining of self-esteem, and the ways in which the presence or absence of self-esteem affects an individual's personality and life.

REASON: You characterize your approach to psychology as "biocentric." Can you elaborate on the meaning of this?

BRANDEN: "Biocentric" means: life-centered. So a biocentric psychology is one that approaches the study of human beings from a biological or a life-centered perspective.

Man is a living organism. Like all other organisms, his primary task is to exercise his capacities in dealing with his environment so as effectively to satisfy his needs, to preserve and enhance his well-being. The way in which an individual deals with this task is, I believe, the key to his psychology.

An understanding of the nature of man must begin with the study of the nature of life. Man's psychological nature can only be grasped in the context of his nature as a living organism. Man's nature, needs and capacities as a specific kind of organism are the source both of his unique achievements and of his potential problems. This is the view that dictated the general approach in *THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-ESTEEM.*

On a more concrete level, here are examples that might help to illuminate what I mean:

When I began my studies of self-esteem, it seemed clear that self-esteem was an inherent need of human beings. What is a need, in the basic biological sense? It is a condition of an organism's survival and well-being, a condition of its continued efficacious functioning. So in order to establish that self-esteem was a need, I asked myself: In what way is self-esteem vital to a human being's survival and well-being? What does it have to do with the effectiveness of his functioning? That's the biocentric approach.

Or take my treatment of the question of mental health. By what standard is mental health or illness to be gauged? I answer that question by working from the premise that the mind has a clear survival-function: to keep the human organism in good

cognitive contact with internal and external reality, with the self and with the world, and thereby to guide and regulate behavior. This led to the conclusion that a person is mentally healthy to the extent that the functioning of his consciousness is unimpeded by blocks, and that he is mentally unhealthy to the extent that blocks obstruct the functioning of his consciousness. That, again, is the biocentric approach.

To carry this last point a bit further: On a very general level, we can say that a person is neurotic to the extent that his perception of reality is distorted by wishes and fears. On a deeper level, neurosis can be understood as representing an interference with, an obstruction of, the normal integrative and self-regulating functions of mind. "Integration" is the key concept here. It's a key concept both in biology and psychology. Integration is central and basic to all living processes and to all cognitive processes. Neurosis is interference with cognitive integration—and thus interference with the life process.

Another illustration of the biocentric approach may be found in my treatment of the issue of volition or "free will" versus determinism. I attempted there to step outside the traditional philosophical context in which that problem is debated, and to approach volition biologically and to place man's power of choice in a biological context.

But beyond such examples—and I could give you many more—I am enormously interested in studying the parallels that I believe to exist between biological processes and psychological processes.

REASON: Do you plan to write about this?

BRANDEN: Eventually.

REASON: Can you relate this approach to your views concerning the development of psychological problems?

BRANDEN: Well, let's consider how psychological problems begin. I am convinced that the root of neurosis—always or almost always—is the process of disowning, or repressing important aspects of one's own experience, repressing needs, emotions and perceptions.

The disowning process begins in childhood. A child may find himself in an environment that is frightening or even terrifying, frustrating, bewildering, perhaps excruciatingly painful. In effect, he feels himself trapped in a nightmare. Intolerable emotions threaten to overwhelm him and to render him incapable of functioning. How is he to protect himself? To preserve his sanity? To preserve his ability to function? That is the problem he confronts. He generates a solution, and within the limits of his knowledge it may be the only solution he can conceive: he learns to disconnect from his own emotions, to block his feelings, to become alienated from his own body.

Naturally, this process does not happen on a fully conscious or verbal level, and it does not happen to the same extent in everyone. Some degree of repression, however, seems to be a universal of childhood.

Later in life, the child's repression may give him no end of trouble; it may be reinforced again and again and may lay the foundation of future neurosis. If he does not learn to reconnect with his feelings, to discover his needs, his functioning will certainly be impaired. But here is the point: as a child, *his repression had survival-value.* In a special sense, one can say it was adaptive. Or the child *felt* it was.

Whether I am dealing with a child or an adult, my first question about a symptom is: What purpose does it serve? What is its *felt* or *experienced* survival-value? *Objectively,* neurotic symptoms reflect self-destructive processes; but *subjectively,* in the context of the individual's own experience and development, they represent an attempt at self-preservation, the protection of sanity or self-esteem, or protection of the person against pain. Symptoms are always goal-directed. They represent attempted solutions to problems.

So, when attempting to understand a symptom, I invite the client to consider: What is or was the problem to which your symptom represents an attempted solution? Is the solution a satisfactory one? Is it constructive? Does it enhance and contribute to your life? If it harms and diminishes your life, are alternative solutions possible?

The characteristic of a neurotic is that he clings to solutions that don't work; he is caught in a rut; he is rigid and inflexible. The essence of the creative approach to life, in contrast to the neurotic approach, lies precisely in the freedom to change, to leap beyond an outmoded context, or rut, to experiment, to improvise, to grasp new connections, to try



something one has not done before.

A neurotic, if he doesn't correct his problems, is something like the dinosaur. Early in life, the neurotic develops certain mechanisms that may have been adaptive at the time, given his particular environment. But now he has grown up, his environment has changed, and those old mechanisms are clearly maladaptive: they do not fit his new environment; he is no longer a helpless child dependent on his parents. But he clings to the old mechanisms, and sometimes goes down with them to destruction, like the dinosaur who perished when he found himself in an environment for which his adaptive mechanisms were inadequate.

The dinosaur was incapable of generating new solutions, new adaptive mechanisms. But a human being, by virtue of his intelligence and his conceptual faculty, has an option: he can question the adaptiveness of his responses to life and, in the case of maladaptive responses, can develop better alternatives.

REASON: You speak of symptoms as being "goal directed." Could you give illustrations?

BRANDEN: Let me tell you about two cases that exemplify what I mean—and, at the same time, will show you something of the way I work.

Once, when I was giving an all-day workshop in New York City, a young man presented the following problem. In his attempts to establish relationships with girls, he said, he invariably was unsuccessful; he went to parties, he went to bars, he approached women and tried to talk to them, but nothing ever went right. The women turned away, or else they gave him phone numbers where they did not live. He was twenty-five years old, he did not consider himself bad looking—and he wasn't—but he had never slept with a girl and, he claimed, this was making his desperately unhappy as well as absolutely bewildered as to why he always failed. He wanted to give me more of his life history but I stopped him at that point and said that I thought we had enough to begin.

The workshop group consisted of twenty-three participants, sitting in a circle. I suggested that we try an exercise that might prove productive. I would give him the first part of a sentence; he would go around to each person in the room in turn, look directly at the person, and repeat the first part of my sentence plus any ending he cared to give it; he was not to worry whether or not his endings were true or false, reasonable or ridiculous. When he positioned himself before the first person, I gave him the phrase I wanted him to work with: "I willfully and deliberately turn girls off by—" He turned to me indignantly. How could I give him such a phrase? Didn't I understand his problem? Hadn't I been listening?

I told him this was only an experiment; an experiment means doing something for the purpose of discovering what will happen when you do it. He turned back to the first person, but instead of looking at that person as I had requested, he looked two feet above at the wall, and his first sentence was: "I willfully and deliberately turn girls off by—never looking at them when I speak to them!" He moved to the next person: "I willfully and deliberately turn girls off by—always acting like a clown and a jerk in their presence." He moved to the next person: "I willfully and deliberately turn girls off by—talking and talking and talking and never listening to a word they say and making it perfectly clear I couldn't care less about what they have to say." While the rest of the room looked on with astonishment, this young man went around to each person and announced twenty-two ways in which he willfully and deliberately turned girls off.

When he had finished, he appeared a bit dazed, almost punchy, and I asked him, "By the way, are any of these statements true?" Incredulously he muttered, "They're all true."

"Fine," I said to him. "Now I want you to try something else. I'm going to give you a number of different phrases now and I want you to come right back with the very first completion of the sentence that occurs to you. Never mind whether or not it makes sense." He indicated that he understood and we proceeded as follows.

"The dinosaur was incapable of generating new solutions, new adaptive mechanisms. But a human being can question the adaptiveness of his responses to life and can develop better alternatives."

I said to him, "I willfully and deliberately turn girls off so that—" He replied, "—so that I won't have to sleep with them." I said, "The prospect of sleeping with a girl is frightening, perhaps, because—" He replied, "I'll be overwhelmed, I'll be annihilated, I'll be wiped out, I'll be pulverized."

Hearing that, the next line of inquiry was obvious. I said, "Mother was always—" He replied, "—domineering, trying to control me in everything I did." I said, "Mother never—" He replied, "—would let me do anything my way; everything had to be her way." I said, "Mother always seemed to expect—" He replied, "—that I be subordinate to her in everything." I said, "That made me feel—" He replied, "—weak, helpless, inadequate, annihilated, pulverized." I said, "Women are to me—" He turned to me in astonishment as he completed the sentence: "—all just like Mother!"

I might mention, in passing, that this full exercise took about nine minutes. When I told this story to one physician he commented, "There goes a year of psychoanalytic therapy."

Anyway, the point is that at the same time the young man was complaining about his failure with women, he was in fact engineering his own defeat—to protect himself in a situation in which he felt weak, helpless and inadequate. Within the context of his neurotic perspective, his bungling with women had survival-value—even though, objectively speaking, it stood in the way of his happiness and fulfillment as a man.

Now, of course, we could go deeper into the roots of his problems and discuss their origin; but that's not really essential in this context. If we did, however, we would find that his dependence on his mother was also goal-directed; it served to keep him a child—and thus to avoid the responsibilities of adulthood.

But let me tell you about another case that's far more dramatic.

REASON: Go ahead.

BRANDEN: This was also a man in his middle twenties—highly intelligent, sensitive, but very passive, very timid, very soft-spoken, very withdrawn and very self-pitying. He was holding down a fairly meaningless job—meaningless, that is, relative to his intellectual potential. He couldn't seem to get his life started. He complained of not knowing how to focus his energies. He complained of not having any friends and of not knowing how to relate to other people. He projected a quality of forlorn helplessness and hopelessness.

One day, in group, he said that he wanted to work on the problem of why he wasn't getting anywhere with his life.

I asked him to begin with what I call "the death-bed exercise"—as described in *THE DISOWNED SELF*—which meant that I asked him to lie on the floor, to close his eyes, and to imagine that he was in a hospital room bed and that he was dying. His life was over; he had only a few more hours to live; all of his chances had been used up. Then I asked him to look up, in imagination, and see his father—who was a Lutheran minister—standing by the side of his bed. "There is so much that you have never said to him," I suggested, "so much that you've kept locked up inside of you. If ever your father would want to hear you, it would be now. If ever it would be possible to reach him, it would be now. Talk to him. Tell him what it was like to be his son."

Slowly and reluctantly he began to talk to his father and to describe various childhood incidents that had been very painful or frightening. He spoke about ways in which he felt his father had been cruel to him—neglecting him in order to be free to do "good works" in the community, and so forth. But his manner was very cerebral, he was obviously disconnected, cut off from his emotions; his words were without feeling. One could see, from looking at him, that he was tensing his body and making himself numb to hold back an immense amount of rage that he felt he dared not express. So I knew we couldn't get anywhere until he could release, express and confront that rage.

I asked him to stop, and shifted into a different exercise. I asked him to remain lying on the floor, to begin shaking his head from side to side, and to say "No!" as he did so. When a person is angry and is holding that anger back, he tenses up the muscles in his back and shoulders—the very muscles that would be mobilized should the anger be released. By having him move his head from side to side, I was making it impossible for his neck muscles to lock completely, and thereby I was hoping to facilitate the release of feeling. Gradually his "Nos" became stronger and angrier—until he was stamping his feet, pounding his fists, and shouting "No!" at the top of his lungs.

Then I asked him to re-enter the hospital fantasy and to talk to his father again. He was emotionally

connected now and he began to scream and to cry and to rage and to tell his father about the many hurts and frustrations that he had endured at his father's hands.

When I began the first exercise, I did so on the hypothesis that his relationship with his father was relevant to his problem; but I did not have a firm conviction as to the direction in which the work was going to take us. Now, suddenly, I had a hunch—an idea struck me—and I asked him to stay in contact with his father in fantasy and simply to say to his father, over and over again, "But I'm getting back at you!"

He began shouting this sentence and as he did so his rage kept climbing to higher and higher peaks of intensity. Then I switched to another exercise; I asked him to do sentence-completions beginning with the phrase: "I'm getting back at you by—"

He screamed, "I'm getting back at you by—being unhappy! I'm getting back at you by—sitting in my room all day alone! I'm getting back at you by—crying all the time: I'm getting back at you by—making a mess of my life! I'm getting back at you by—holding stupid, senseless jobs that don't lead anywhere! I'm getting back at you by—not having any friends! I'm getting back at you by—never letting myself be happy! I'm getting back at you by—never for a minute forgetting how much you hurt me! I'm getting back at you by—keeping my anger for you alive! I'm getting back at you by—never giving you anything to be proud of!"

So here you can see that the very symptoms of which he was complaining were serving a specific purpose; they were goal-directed.

REASON: Prior to the exercise, was he conscious of what he was doing?

BRANDEN: Not in the ordinary sense of the word "conscious." Obviously the knowledge was in his brain in some form, or the exercise wouldn't have worked as it did, but the information was blocked from conscious awareness.

Once I walked into the waiting room of my office and there was a very pretty girl of seven or eight years old, whose father was being seen by another therapist in my office. She said to me, "Mister, what do you do in there?" I really felt puzzled for a moment: how was I going to explain to a child the nature of my work? Then I said to her, "Well . . . what I do is . . . I teach people that they know all kinds of things they think they don't know." She smiled and thought for a moment and said, "Gee, that's pretty good." "I think so too," I told her.

These two case histories demonstrate what I mean.

REASON: Is it characteristic of your way of working to move very rapidly from one exercise or technique to another, as you did with the second case?

BRANDEN: I call that method "compounding"—riding on a kind of momentum that crashes through walls and defenses. Sometimes I work that way; sometimes not; it's not standard operating policy—it depends upon the particular problem.

REASON: Let's go a little bit deeper into this second case. What was the man really after by acting as he did?

BRANDEN: I would say that his self-defeating behavior had two immediate goals: it was an act of revenge, a way of inflicting pain on his father—and, at the same time, a scream for help, a way of signaling to his father: "See what you've done to me? See how unhappy I am? *Now* will you be a father to me and satisfy my needs?"

Now why was he unwilling to accept the past and put it behind him? Why was he unwilling to say, in effect, "Okay, I had a rotten, miserable, frustrating childhood. But I'm not a child any longer. So what am I going to make of my life?"

REASON: We were wondering about that.

BRANDEN: Part of the reason is that he had never adequately dealt with his childhood pain, never got it out of his system; he had frozen himself emotionally in order to avoid feeling it—and had paralyzed himself intellectually in the process.

But deeper than that was the longing to remain a child—in the hope that somehow those frustrated childhood needs would be fulfilled by someone. To put the past behind him would mean to accept the fact that those needs were never going to be fulfilled, that it was too late, that there is nothing more to be done, except to get on with his life. He couldn't or wouldn't tolerate that.

In the end, we are dealing here—as always—with the issue of a person's willingness or unwillingness to assume full responsibility for his own existence. This is the real meaning of adulthood and of maturity. It is a state that few people reach—or reach completely.

REASON: Probably many people who are familiar with your earlier work, with its heavy philosophical emphasis, would be surprised at the kind of therapy you are practicing.

BRANDEN: I suppose so. Occasionally a person comes to therapy imagining that our work is going to

"Most group therapy consists of the various participants psychologizing on one another. They tell one another what's wrong with them and what to do. I don't believe in that."

consist of philosophical discussions. I don't say that philosophical analysis has no place in therapy—sometimes it can be very valuable—but only after a person has begun to confront and re-own the repressed split-off aspects of his own personality.

Clients have to learn to challenge and attack false ideas, true enough. But so long as a person is self-alienated, so long as he is cut-off from his own feelings, intellectual analysis or discussion tends to be rather unproductive. Sometimes, it only serves to strengthen his defenses, to take him farther and farther away from himself.

REASON: What's striking about the cases you cite is that the clients made the discoveries themselves. You didn't act as the interpreter of their reports.

BRANDEN: Precisely. That's essential to the way I work. Interpretation on the part of the therapist must be kept to an absolute minimum, and avoided whenever possible. It's too easy to suggest mistaken interpretations to a vulnerable and susceptible client. But what the client discovers and confronts for himself has the marvelously satisfying stamp of authenticity. And the therapist doesn't fall into the trap of playing the omniscience game.

REASON: What you do is rather different from what one usually thinks of as group therapy.

BRANDEN: Most group therapy consists of the various participants psychologizing on one another. They tell one another what's wrong with them and what to do. I don't believe in that. I have never been convinced of its effectiveness. And sometimes it can be harmful. What I do is really a kind of individual therapy in a group context; however, the presence of the group is necessary and helpful for many of my exercises. And when an individual has finished working, I invite the group to give him feedback in terms of each member's own feelings and experiences while watching the person who is working. The various group members might discuss what they heard in the person's work that is relevant to themselves.

REASON: Does a client ever refuse to try one of your exercises?

BRANDEN: Occasionally. Not often. But everything is voluntary. If he doesn't want to try something, no one is going to insist.

No one even asks the client to work. The initiative for working on a problem is left entirely to the individual. When he feels ready to work, he asks to work. Nobody plays Big Daddy and leads him by the hand. If a client wants to sit in group for two months and never open his mouth, that's his privilege. But when he does open his mouth, it's a big step—and he did it himself.

REASON: Your therapy doesn't consist entirely of exercises?

BRANDEN: No. But I use them a great deal. I try to devise exercises that will allow an individual to discover truths he needs to know, with a minimum of comment or interpretation from me. But when a comment or explanation is necessary, of course I give it.

Also, I like to propose exercises or experiments for a person to do outside of therapy, in normal life situations, that hopefully will contribute to his growth. When a client has been behaving in a self-destructive manner, I encourage him to experiment with alternative ways of acting—and to discover what happens when he abandons his self-defeating maneuvers.

Sometimes in therapy—not too often—I will talk, just talk, about the wider meanings and principles to be found in the work we are doing or in the work of a particular client. Or I will talk about philosophical or religious ideas prevalent in our culture that encourage the development of neurotic symptoms. Or I will talk about principles of clear and effective thinking. But such discussions are generally kept to a minimum. It's too easy to waste time with verbal exchanges that have no therapeutic value. On some days I will simply move from one exercise to another, with virtually no discussion or conversation at all.

REASON: In *THE DISOWNED SELF,* you speak of three concepts that are central to your work: self-awareness, self-responsibility, self-assertiveness. Could you amplify the meaning of these terms?

BRANDEN: Let me insert a fourth concept: self-acceptance. The pillar of self-esteem and mental health is these four ideas: *self-awareness, self-acceptance, self-responsibility, self-assertiveness.* Now what do they mean?

Self-awareness. Awareness of what? I would answer: awareness of feelings, needs, desires, emotions, ideas, evaluations and behavior. So therapy begins with teaching clients how to be self-aware, how to know what they are feeling and what they are doing.

Self-acceptance. Acceptance of what? Acceptance of all the items I have just named. Acceptance of the fact that all of these feelings, ideas, behavior and so forth are expressions of the self *at the time they occur.* Self-acceptance entails the refusal to disown any of these aspects of the self, any of these instances of self-expression. Not necessarily to approve of all of them, but to accept them as real and as one's own. Acceptance of the reality of one's own being, of one's own inner experience and one's own behavior. So, self-acceptance literally means: full realism applied to the realm of inner experience as well as to behavior. You know, people can verbally or intellectually acknowledge their feelings or reactions while denying them emotionally and psychologically, refusing to accept and integrate them. So self-acceptance means more than merely verbal acknowledgement; it means integration.

Self-responsibility. Responsibility for what? Responsibility for being the cause of one's own choices and one's own acts. Not responsibility in the sense of moral blame, but responsibility in the sense of recognizing one's self as the chief causal agent in one's life and behavior. Further, self-responsibility means: acceptance of responsibility for one's own existence. Acceptance of one's basic—metaphysical—aloneness. Acceptance of responsibility for the attainment of one's own goals. This last is extremely important. This is a theme I hit again and again in therapy. No one plays the "helplessness game" on a desert island; we can tell ourselves and others that we are helpless only if we expect someone to pick up the responsibility we have dropped.

Self-assertiveness. Assertiveness of what? Of one's desires and judgments. Of one's needs. Of one's right to exist and to be happy. Sometimes, as an exercise, I will ask a client to face the group and simply say, again and again, "I have a right to exist." For some clients, this is very difficult. It's interesting to observe what happens. First, the statement may be made hesitantly and tearfully; later, it may be made angrily; then, eventually, it is made firmly and with conviction. One can see the whole posture and demeanor of the person has changed: he has released his own power; he experiences his own strength; he asserts his own existence.

On the psychological level, these four concepts are the foundation of morality. A person can lead a moral life only to the extent that he practices self-awareness, self-acceptance, self-responsibility and self-assertiveness. Virtues such as honesty or productiveness or integrity are consequences of these principles and follow naturally from them.

These are principles children should be taught from the start of their life. These are attitudes parents must learn to cultivate, encourage and develop in their children.

The consequence of these principles is self-esteem.

REASON: Coming back to your opposition to what might be described as "didactic therapy," do you never directly argue with a client's ideas if you think those ideas are mistaken and are harming him?

BRANDEN: I never argue. If a client expresses a moral or philosophical notion I think is wrong, I may express my own view, but then I will invite him to explore the roots of his. If he really is mistaken, my job is to devise a means to help him to discover that fact by himself—not because I have talked him into it.

I think that, a great deal of the time, psychotherapists who argue with their client's mistaken ideas are naive. Let me give an example that may help to explain why.

Suppose a married couple comes to therapy for counseling. Their relationship is in trouble because the woman is very inhibited sexually. She claims to believe that there is something bad or sinful about sex.

Now many therapists at this point will decide that the first step of treatment is to get her to revise her thinking about sex, to persuade her that her ideas about sex are wrong. So they begin to work at educating her or propagandizing her about how good and wonderful sex is. That would not be my approach—at least, not generally.

REASON: What would you be likely to do?

BRANDEN: Well, since she is a human being who presumably has normal human needs and feelings and capacities, I assume that the ability and the desire to respond to sex positively already exists in her, only something is blocking it. Sex can be such a profound source of joy to human beings that I find it difficult to believe that a person authentically and all the way down regards sex as evil. Often, a person *knows,* intellectually, that sex is not evil, but claims for some reason to *feel* it's evil. So that's what has to be explored.

I might have the woman do a sentence completion exercise, beginning with the phrase, "The bad thing about sex is—" Or I might use the phrase, "Bad to me means—" And do you know what kind of completion I'm very likely to get? "The bad thing about sex is—Mother says it's dirty and rotten and sinful." "Bad to me means—disobeying Mother's wishes."

If this is the way the woman's responses developed—and this is not the only possibility, of course—she is led to reformulate her problem. She no

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longer says that she is sexually inhibited because she thinks or feels that sex is evil. She says that she inhibits herself sexually because she is frightened to do anything that might invoke her mother's disapproval. That is an altogether different proposition.

Now she is ready to explore the problem of her dependence on her mother. And we have saved ourselves hours and hours of discussions about the merits of sex. And when she is free of dependence on her mother, free to acknowledge and act on her own honest feelings, she is unlikely to need lectures from me on sex.

I want to make one qualification concerning what I have just said. In matters of sex, it is true that people are often dreadfully ignorant and misinformed and that therapists and marriage counselors often do have to educate their clients concerning "the facts of life." But that is a somewhat different matter from arguing philosophically about the meaning of sex. I hope this distinction is clear.

REASON: It is. But are you saying that all philosophically mistaken ideas are psychologically or neurotically motivated?

BRANDEN: Certainly not. That would be an absurd position to maintain. No, I am thinking of certain basic highly irrational and highly self-destructive notions, such as the notion that pleasure is evil, that have no conceivable basis in reality, no even superficial plausibility. In such cases, what has to be explored is why the person feels compelled to cling to such ideas, what purpose such ideas serve for him.

REASON: In working with clients, you are known to sometimes use techniques of Gestalt therapy. How prominently do they figure in your work?

BRANDEN: I do use Gestalt techniques, sometimes, when they seem appropriate to the situation. Or my own modifications of Gestalt techniques. But I am not a Gestalt therapist. Far from it. I have many disagreements with the Gestalt orientation, although some of the individual techniques are very effective.

I lean toward what Arnold Lazarus calls in his book, *BEHAVIOR THERAPY AND BEYOND,* "technical eclecticism." Not *theoretical* eclecticism, but *technical* eclecticism. Ultimately, there can be only one theoretically correct way of understanding human psychology, motivation, neurosis and so forth. But many different techniques, originating in many different schools, may prove useful in attacking particular problems.

A therapist should have as wide a repertoire of techniques at his command as possible, so that he can fit what he does to the specific client and the specific problem, rather than cling rigidly to one particular method whether or not it is the most suitable method in a particular case. So, aside from the techniques I have developed myself, I employ techniques developed by other schools when and as they seem suitable.

I think what probably distinguishes my way of working is my integration of the cognitive and the emotional, my method of constantly moving back and forth between the conceptual and the experiential, which is not a matter of a single technique but rather reflects a basic attitude, a philosophy, that is expressed through a multiplicity of techniques and the way in which they are interrelated practically, when I am working on specific problems.

Coming back to Gestalt therapy for a moment, I think that by itself it is very limited. It is not enough. One of my main objections is that it is so very anti-intellectual. "Thinking" is a bad word in Gestalt therapy. No distinction is made between authentic, rational thinking and phony, defensive intellectualizing. I once attempted to discuss the anti-intellectualism of Gestalt therapy with a prominent leader in the Gestalt movement, and do you know what he said to me? He earnestly assured me that Gestalt therapy couldn't possibly be anti-intellectual since its founder, Fritz Perls, was a highly educated and cultured man.

REASON: Do you see any value in Behavior therapy?

BRANDEN: We have to distinguish between Behaviorism as a psychological theory, to which I am profoundly opposed, and Behavior therapy as a set of techniques, some of which are very useful. "Behavior therapy" is not a unified school, and means different things to different practitioners. But some of the techniques associated with this orientation have demonstrated their effectiveness and have a valid place in a therapist's repertoire. One can agree that a particular technique is effective without necessarily agreeing with someone's theoretical interpretation of *why* it is effective. So at times I certainly do what can be described as "Behavior therapy." I would venture to guess that in some sense most therapists do.

REASON: Is it correct that you now exclusively do group therapy?



BRANDEN: Yes. For a number of years I did only individual therapy and was enormously skeptical about the value of group therapy. I couldn't imagine how working in a group setting could produce profound results. But a friend of mine, Dr. Roger Callahan, was doing group therapy as well as individual therapy and he invited me to sit in and watch him work. I was very impressed; I saw possibilities that simply hadn't occurred to me. That was in the mid-1960's.

Subsequently, in New York City, I did some experimental work with a few groups and became enormously excited by that way of working. It took me some time after that to develop my own distinctive method of group therapy which, as we mentioned earlier, is rather different that what most people think of as group therapy. In my experience, group therapy is for the majority of clients *more* effective, not *less* effective, than individual therapy. Now obviously this depends on the specific kind of therapy practiced and the particular skills of the therapist. There are many different kinds of individual therapy. There are very competent psychotherapists who work only on an individual basis. There is no reason why everyone has to work the same way. The way a therapist chooses to work is in part, of course, an expression of his own personality. The only point is to get results. For myself, I enjoy group therapy enormously and am convinced that I do my best work in that setting.

The range of experience offered to clients in groups is much wider and richer than that offered in individual therapy, and can be used to facilitate growth.

I think of my groups in effect as personal growth seminars. *Experiential* seminars, as contrasted with *didactic* seminars. I don't even think so much in terms of therapy, but rather in terms of growth, of helping the individual to discover and release his potential, intellectually, creatively, emotionally, sexually.

Sometimes a person comes to see me who I feel is not right for group therapy or not right for the specific kind of work I do, in which case I refer him to a colleague for individual work.

I have two special groups of clients, who, instead of meeting once a week for two hours, as in my regular groups, meet once a month for two days, on a weekend, for concentrated work. I started this more or less at the request of a number of clients who felt that their growth and development was better facilitated in the context of two-day workshops than in once-a-week regular groups. So I started one weekend group as a trial project, and the results were so satisfying that I began a second weekend group. It's very demanding, but very, very rewarding.

REASON: In addition to which, you give two-day workshops in various cities around the country?

BRANDEN: Yes.

REASON: Are clients ever turned off by your approach to therapy?

BRANDEN: Of course. If they don't mean business, if they don't really want to get into their problems, if they just want to play at therapy, I'm the wrong man to come to. Once, after doing an exercise that was very self-revealing, a client said to me, "You don't leave a person any place to hide." The next day he quit therapy. It's too bad. He was an intelligent person. But he had great resistance to knowing what he was feeling and what purposes were motivating his actions. When the exercise revealed some of this information to him, he had a choice: to deal with it—or to run. In therapy, courage is the name of the game. Courage to feel and confront and know and accept, and to take responsibility.

REASON: I'd like to return to an earlier point in our discussion. When you were talking about self-responsibility, you said that no one plays the "helplessness game" on a desert island. What do you mean by that? Don't you believe that people can genuinely feel and be helpless?

BRANDEN: If an avalanche is falling on you and there is no place to run, you are absolutely helpless; there is nothing to do but die. But that is not the condition of most people most of the time.

"Anyone who engages in the practice of psychotherapy confronts every day the devastation wrought by the teachings of religion."

Of course we can sometimes feel helpless, in a specific situation, when we don't immediately know what to do or how to cope; but if we struggle to preserve the clarity of our mind, if we take the responsibility of looking for a solution, we are not surrendering to helplessness in a deeper, metaphysical sense, and we are not abandoning our will to efficacy.

The "helplessness game" consists of parading one's feelings of helplessness as a means of manipulating others into taking responsibility for the solution of one's problems or the burden of one's existence.

Sometimes when a client complains of feelings of helplessness, I will have him do a sentence completion exercise, "The good thing about feeling helpless is—" And then we hear such sentences as, "The good thing about feeling helpless is—people will feel sorry for me." "The good thing about feeling helpless is—I won't have to do anything." "The good thing about feeling helpless is—I don't have to get angry." "The good thing about feeling helpless is—someone will do something." "The good thing about feeling helpless is—I won't have to act and risk making a mistake." And so on.

In a similar way, people often produce confusion in themselves. I remember a young woman who complained that, at parties, when people began to discuss politics, she found herself becoming very confused and unable to follow or understand what they were saying. I gave her an exercise and she came out with such sentences as, "The good thing about being confused is—nobody will get mad at me for my political opinions." "The good thing about being confused is—I don't have to take a stand." "The good thing about being confused is—I won't be able to understand what people are saying and so I won't have to challenge them."

REASON: So we're back to the goal-directedness of symptoms again.

BRANDEN: That's right.

REASON: You seem very partial to the sentence completion technique.

BRANDEN: If I could use only one technique, that is the one I would choose. I have many different versions of it. One version is explained at length in *THE DISOWNED SELF.* But there are many other ways of working with sentence completion that I have developed. This technique is very complex and sophisticated; it may look easy, but it isn't; to use it well, to use it imaginatively and effectively, takes considerable practice and experience.

One of the things I like about the technique, in any of its variations, is that, when a client is properly into the exercise and working well, it becomes simultaneously a cognitive and emotional experience for him—sometimes a very explosive one. In some circumstances this exercise is sufficient, by itself, to produce dramatic changes in a person, to eliminate neurotic symptoms and inspire radical improvements in behavior.

REASON: When people are led to realize the goal-directedness of their symptoms, does that produce feelings of guilt?

BRANDEN: No. Emphatically not. Nor should it. For many clients, the reaction is one of relief and a sense of freedom—as though the client feels that his life's been given back into his own hands or, more precisely, he comes to realize that it always was in his own hands.

The client is encouraged to be, in effect, a good friend to himself and try to understand why he felt that his particular symptoms or neurotic method of behaving was *necessary*—in other words, why he felt his survival and self-esteem required it. Then he is ready to question the assumption of such necessity and is open to consider alternatives.

Speaking of guilt, you know, that's an emotion I tend to be suspicious of. I'm suspicious of self-condemnation in general. It, too, can be goal directed.

REASON: What possible purpose can it serve?

BRANDEN: "I'm no good—so expect nothing of me." "I'm no good—I said it first, so I don't have to wait in terror for you to say it." "I'm no good—so I don't have to try, I don't have to struggle, there's no point in struggling, since I'm worthless, anyway."

REASON: Is all guilt motivated by such considerations?

BRANDEN: No. But it's a possibility one has to be aware of.

Sometimes, a person wants to believe he's worthless in order to justify his parents' cruel treatment. By taking the blame on himself, he absolves his parents.

REASON: Why does he do that?

BRANDEN: Because, as a child, it feels too terrifying to regard himself as innocent, in view of how his parents treat him. That would mean, from his point of view, that they must be monsters. And he can't live with that idea—it's too frightening. So, paradoxically, out of self-protection, he takes the blame on himself—and may go on doing so for the rest of his life.

REASON: Can you relate your theory of self-esteem to the goal-directedness of symptoms?

BRANDEN: On the biological level, the ultimate goal and standard of the organism's activity—metabolic activity, self-repairing activity, and so forth—is the life of the organism itself, the preservation of its ability to function.

On the psychological level, the ultimate goal and standard is preservation of self-esteem, by which I mean: of a person's confidence in the efficacy of his mind, in his sense of control, and in his worth as a person.

If, for instance, a person disowns and represses various feelings, emotions, desires, he does so because he experiences them as threatening, threatening to his mental equilibrium, to his sense of control, to his effective functioning, or to his sense of personal worth. If a person retreats into fantasy rather than deal with the challenges of life, if he avoids testing his capabilities in action, he does so to preserve the illusion of a self-esteem he does not in fact possess.

The fear of aloneness, of self-responsibility, of loss of love, of rejection, all are related to fear of a basic feeling of powerlessness, ineffectiveness, helplessness in the face of reality. As I said in *THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-ESTEEM,* man's deepest fear is not in dying but of feeling unfit to live, inadequate to the challenges of life, unworthy of existence.

REASON: In all three of your books you stress the fact that the teachings of religion are inimical to self-esteem and mental health. Do you plan to write on this subject at greater length in the future?

BRANDEN: I don't plan a specific book on the subject, but I do have more I would like to say and I rather think I will create some opportunity, at some point, to say it.

Many people are readily able to recognize the psychologically harmful effects of religion's antagonism to sex. That *has* been written about. But that is far from the whole story. Religion is much more than antisex. It is antimind, antiself-esteem, anti-intellectual self-confidence, antiself-assertiveness, antipleasure, antiself-interest. Which means, basically, that religion is antilife.

Philosophers have expressed themselves on the destructiveness of religion. Disgracefully, psychologists and psychiatrists have not, with very rare exceptions. Almost invariably they have chosen to remain silent on a subject of life-and-death importance to their profession.

Imagine a noxious agent in the environment that is infecting and killing millions of people, and the medical profession knows about it, but remains silent. What would you think? That is the state of psychology and psychiatry today—with religion, of course, being the noxious agent.

REASON: Is it possible that psychologists and psychiatrists are unaware of the harmful effects of religion?

BRANDEN: No, it is not possible. Anyone who engages in the practice of psychotherapy confronts every day the devastation wrought by the teachings of religion.

REASON: Then how do you explain the fact that you are one of the very few writers, in your field, who has chosen to deal with this issue in print?

BRANDEN: I can suggest two reasons. The first is that most psychologists and psychiatrists are—at least, such is my impression—very unphilosophical, very unaccustomed to thinking philosophically or dealing with philosophical issues. So I suspect that many therapists feel "over their heads" in this territory.

But I don't think that is the major reason. I believe the chief reason is moral cowardice. I remember my astonishment, many years ago, when I heard the head of a department of psychology say, "Imagine having the courage to announce over television that you are an atheist!" On another occasion, trying to discuss the subject with a prominent psychiatrist, I was told, "If you try to challenge people on religion, they'll kill you."

Most of the time, what I have encountered when I try to discuss this subject is some of the most incredible rationalizing and double-talk I have ever heard.

In my view, psychologists and psychiatrists who know the truth on this subject and who have access to public communication, but remain silent, are traitors to their profession. If preventive therapy is every psychologist's and psychiatrist's professed dream, then an expose of the harmful consequences of childhood exposure to the teachings of religion is a pretty good place to begin.

REASON: One final question. Are there any political implications to the work you do as a psychotherapist? Or to express the question differently, is there

any connection between your psychological theories and your political convictions?

BRANDEN: All political theories rest, explicitly or implicitly, on a view of human nature, a concept of what man is, as well as a view of the values and code of conduct appropriate to him. My political convictions are a consequence and expression of my psychological and ethical convictions.

If, as a psychotherapist and as a human being, I value autonomy, individuality, self-responsibility, then it is not surprising that, in the sphere of politics, I am an advocate of political freedom—of libertarianism—of a social system based on the inviolability of individual rights.

Since you ask about the relationship between psychology and politics, I would like to make this observation. There is an interesting situation in psychology and psychiatry today. On the one hand, there is a growing endorsement of the ideals of autonomy and self-responsibility, which, naturally, I think is a very healthy and desirable trend. But, on the other hand, most psychologists and psychiatrists are, according to available studies, predominantly inclined to collectivism and statism. Here, then, is a very radical contradiction.

In their offices, these psychotherapists maintain that the individual must learn to be responsible for his own existence. But in political discussions they support the notion that no one should have to bear the burden of his own existence and that it is the task of "society" or "the state" to assume that responsibility. In their capacity as psychotherapists, they recognize the phoniness and warn of the destructiveness of self-sacrifice. But in their capacity as social commentators, they do not hesitate to advocate the sacrifice of the individual for "the good of society."

It is therapists of the so-called "third force" or "humanistic" orientation that talk most about autonomy and self-responsibility, and it is among this group that the contradiction is most apparent.

It is remarkable how they manage to avoid confronting it. But sooner or later they will have to confront it; the contradiction will explode in their faces. Then it will be interesting to see which half of their contradiction they retain and which half they discard. ◻

I stood shrouded in loneliness
Just watching, new sights, new sounds.
When I spotted you among the others
And you were coming toward me -
But I seemed rooted in the sand.

You appeared gentle, yet of gathering strength
With swelling curves and delicate balance.
If, as you crested, our energies could mingle
We'd be carried to exhilarating heights.
But I seemed rooted in the sand.

I had held myself away from the others' reach.
But you kept coming until we touched
And felt each other's warmth.
Then slowly you began slipping away -
But I seemed rooted in the sand.

Henry Hohenstein

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Will Rothbard's Free-Market Justice Suffice?

NO

JOHN HOSPERS

It was a pleasure indeed to read the excerpts in the March issue of *REASON* from Murray Rothbard's forthcoming book, *TOWARD A NEW LIBERTY.* The appeal of anarchism to libertarians, including limited-government libertarians, is always considerable: if government should stay out of religion, out of education, out of management-labor relations, and out of all other economic matters, well, having gone so far, wouldn't it be nice to say that government should stay out of *everything*—i.e., that there should be no function left for government to perform, and hence there need be no government at all? Having gone so far, why not go all the way? It would be so much more neat and tidy that way, so simple and beautiful, so aesthetically appealing. Besides, it would solve—or dissolve—at one stroke several nasty problems, such as "What right has anyone to govern my life (or any aspect of it) without my consent?" And since obviously we never (individually) consented to having government, not even limited government, having no government at all would immediately solve that problem.

Or would it? (a) It would, for those anarchist-libertarians who are content to be pacifists and not grant anyone's right to prosecute or punish another, even in retaliation. If someone mugs me or robs me, and you say I should have no recourse against him, well then, I am not (alone or thru a defense agency) doing anything against him without his consent. (b) But most libertarians, including anarchist libertarians, will not be willing to stomach this; and they believe, as indeed Rothbard does, that the aggrieved party could, via his defense agency, subject the guilty party—or the party thought to be guilty—to arrest, trial, and imprisonment. (In fact, one wouldn't have to do it thru a defense agency; one could "take justice into his own hands" and hunt the suspect down himself, without benefit of any agency, wreaking on him whatever vengeance he deems appropriate or feels like dispensing. After all, no one would be required by law to delegate to others the job of self-defense.) And this, whether done by individuals or hired agencies, is meddling with his life without his consent. The introduction of defense agencies as a substitute for government police forces, then, would in no way solve the problem of consent, since in both cases one could be subject to arrest and punishment (in the one case by the police, in the other case by the accuser or his defense agency) *without* one's having consented to it, or to the system of free-market defense agencies and courts which would be brought to bear against him.

Rothbard's remarks are not, however, addressed to the problem of consent; he says nothing about it, and perhaps he does not consider it a genuine problem. What he does address his remarks to is the subject of private defense (both police and army), in an attempt to show that the problems we get into with government defense (municipal and county police, national armed forces) are satisfactorily taken care of if one substitutes private defense for government defense.

I do not think that this attempt is successful. I shall give a few reasons why. But my remarks will not be an attempt to defend government as a means of

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INTRODUCTION

We anticipated when we published Murray Rothbard's article, "Free-Market Police Courts, and Law" in our March 1973 issue, that we would provoke controversy and stimulate lively debate on the government/no government controversy. Rothbard's article, excerpted from his landmark book, FOR A NEW LIBERTY *(just published by Macmillan), presented a thoughtful argument in favor of utilizing the market—rather than government—to provide* all *goods and services, including police protection and a court system.* REASON *is pleased to continue the debate by publishing Dr. John Hospers' response to the Rothbard article, together with Dr. Rothbard's reply to Dr. Hospers. Dr. Hospers is professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and author of* LIBERTARIANISM *(published by Nash Press and in paperback by Reason Press).*

Rothbard and Hospers are two of the leading scholars in the Libertarian movement, and REASON *has made a special effort to let our readers have the opportunity this month to read and evaluate their opposing contentions concerning this uniquely libertarian controversy.*

YES

MURRAY N ROTHBARD

In view of the fact that I regard Dr. Hospers as the outstanding contemporary theorist and spokesman for "limited archy," his above comment strikes me as being highly significant. For Dr. Hospers virtually admits that he can offer no positive defense for government protection, and his strictures against anarcho-capitalism must be considered in the context of his concession about the (at least) equivalent defects of limited government. Dr. Hospers has arrived at the point where he regards anarchism as making no difference from limited government. Indifferent as between anarchism and limited government, Dr. Hospers is teetering on the edge of anarchism, and I am hopeful that he will eventually take the plunge. Certainly he is moving in the right direction.

Of course I believe that anarchism makes a *great deal* of difference. The anarchism/limited government controversy must be considered in two parts: the moral, and the practical or utilitarian. Morally, which for me is the prime consideration, it seems to me unquestionable that, given the libertarian premise of nonaggression, anarchism wins hands down. For if, as all libertarians believe, no one may morally initiate physical force against the person or property of another, then limited government has built within it two fatal principles of impermissible aggression. First, it presumes to establish a compulsory monopoly of defense (police, courts, law) service over some given geographical area. So that individual property-owners who prefer to subscribe to another defense company within that area are not allowed to do so. Second, the limited government obtains its revenues by the aggression—the robbery—of taxation, a compulsory levy on the inhabitants of the geographical area. All governments, however limited they may be otherwise, commit at least these two fundamental crimes against liberty and private property. And even if one were to advocate the first feature without the second, so as to have only voluntary contributions to government, the first aggressive and therefore criminal feature of government would remain. Anarcho-capitalism advocates the abolition of these two features, and *therefore* the abolition of the State, and the supplying of defense service along with all other goods and services on the free market.

Dr. Hospers maintains that if one private agency should "predominate in a certain area, it would in effect *be* the government . . . there would be very little difference" between that and a single government agency of protection. I will return to this problem below, but here it must be pointed out that even in these conditions, it makes a *great deal* of difference, because (a) individuals can always have the right to call in another, competing defense agency; and (b) the private agency would acquire its income from the voluntary purchases of satisfied customers, rather than from the robbery of taxation. In short, the difference would be between a free society and a society with built-in and legalized aggression. Between anarchism and archy.

To sum up, on moral grounds I don't think the limited archists have a leg to stand on: given the libertarian axiom, they must logically end up as

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defense—I am quite well aware of the problems one gets into when one has a government monopoly of anything, whether of economic goods, of education, or of defense. Rather than saying that government does solve these problems, I shall contend that the private defense agencies as envisioned by Rothbard don't solve them either—that there are problems, perhaps equally thorny, with *both* solutions, and in fact that some of the problems are the same whether it is government or a private agency that one resorts to for supplying the defense.

1. ENFORCEMENT

The picture Rothbard draws of competing defense agencies and competing court systems, seems to me entirely too optimistic, for a number of reasons of which I shall give just a few:

1. " 'Suppose an emergency occurs and a Company A policeman sees someone beingmugged; will he stop to ask if the victim has bought insurance from Company A?' . . . [T]his sort of street crime will be taken care of . . . by the police hired by whoever owns the street in question. But what of the unlikely case that a neighborhood does not have street police, and a policeman of Company A happens to see someone being attacked?" (p.7) Rothbard suggests that since the streets, like all land areas, would be privately owned the owner of the street in question "takes care of" that situation by ensuring that the street is properly guarded.

Not necessarily. It is not at all "an unlikely event" that the street will be unguarded by its owners' private patrols. The owner might not care; he might be a multimillionaire absentee owner to whom the street doesn't really matter—it might figure so minutely in his scheme of things that he not only wouldn't care whether people were mugged there, but he wouldn't care if lawsuits were brought against him for which he had to pay (though it is difficult to see how he could compulsorily be brought to court and made to pay, *if* the entire scheme were voluntary). In any case, it wouldn't matter much to him, so why should he care?

2. Entirely too much confidence is placed on "the good reputation" which a man or an agency wishes to uphold. A man of sufficient affluence might not care at all about this, and not need to care any more (he no longer needs other people's good will). Or, a person or agency could well be in a position to be indifferent to his reputation in the eyes of most people: consider an agency which was hired by a group of rich men to assassinate some of their favorite enemies. For a fee, they would surely do it (as the Mafia does now); they would probably do whatever brought them the most profit, and in this case they could well make the largest profits out of criminal activities, if the payers were rich enough. Enriched by their pay for crime, they could well afford to be indifferent to their reputation in the eyes of the remainder of the community.

3. Moreover, hope of financial gain is not the only motivation people have; and Rothbard's account tends to assume that people will do whatever can make them the most money. If a person feels himself to be more moral or righteous than his fellows, he may surrender a fortune in the interests of promoting his particular morality. Robert Welch was so convinced of the rightness of his convictions as president of the John Birch Society that he gave up his entire interest in a highly lucrative company when his associates in the company complained that his association with the Birch Society was hurting the company financially. And a person who is on an antipornography bender would be very likely to gather together with others who share his convictions, and form a defense agency which will arrest and try all sellers of pornography according to the rules of the newly formed agency. Even if he loses money in doing so, he will probably do it if his convictions are strong enough. And since any agency can be created when there is a demand, then as long as there is a demand (as there is) for punishing the purveyors of pornography, agencies (both defense and arbitration) would be created to meet this demand. And if most of the people in a certain community shared these antipornographic convictions, and belonged to the agency that was paid by them to implement these convictions, it would be tough for any "adult book stores" or X-rated movies in that community.

4. Nor is it true that if there were no governments there would be no atomic, bacteriological (etc.) weapons. It would all depend on how much help certain scientists and inventors decided to give to certain defense agencies. Suppose that in Beverly Hills there resides a large number of men such as Werner Von Braun and Edmund Teller, who have the know-how to make nuclear weapons for their defense agencies; and suppose that there also reside there Howard Hughes and a number of other millionaires who are not averse to mass-producing such weapons and have their agency possess them, and use these weapons against whoever *they* think should be prosecuted or punished. In the absence of a "legal government," who is to stop them? The same ingenuity that has led to the manufacture of nuclear weapons for governments, could lead to their manufacture for private agencies; and the same millions of dollars that have made the manufacture of these weapons by governments possible, would also make them possible in the hands of private individuals and their hired agencies. If you lived in West Los Angeles

(adjacent to Beverly Hills), and for some reason were unpopular with the Hughes-Teller combine in Beverly Hills, your lot would not be an enviable one: even if you moved, their defense agency could track you down anywhere—and would, after their detectives' palms were greased to the tune of a few thousand dollars—and, for a few thousand more, they could dispose of you without leaving a trace. There would really be nothing and nobody to stop them. They would be like the lord of the manor whose serfs are his private property—only this would be an oligarchy of wealth rather than of political influence.

5. Nor would we be in a good position even against "the Russians." If all governments simultaneously disbanded throughout the world, there would be no problem—or at least *that* problem (nations making war on each other) would not exist. But that possibility is again science-fiction fantasy. The problem we would have to face, then, would still be what dangers would face the degovernmentalized United States once the leaders of foreign nations such as the U.S.S.R. saw a chance to take over a huge chunk of American real estate—perhaps by using a weapon that would kill off the people while leaving all the real estate intact. It would certainly present international communism with an almost irresistible temptation.

6. Perhaps the most important assumption of all in Rothbard's essay is that there would continue to be a group of defense agencies (and court systems) which *would remain competitive.* This is indeed one way in which the scenario could be written. But there are other ways. Suppose that one agency became so superbly efficient, or for some other reason attracted to itself so many paying customers, that it became larger than any of the other agencies, and continued to grow larger with time, until it had, say, 99% of the business for a thousand miles around. As a defense agency, it would possess most of the weapons in that area. Its leaders would then be in a position to dominate the entire region by force of arms; they could have their way with any minority agency which did not agree with their decisions. It could force its will upon the other agencies, or buy them out, or for that matter it could collude with them to provide no defense service at all, but simply turn aggressor: why should they provide service any longer when by force of arms they could take over the whole area? There are circumstances in which theft is easier than honest labor, and this might well be one of them. We would then have a defense agency grown so swollen with success that it could do just what it liked: it could turn into a criminal gang, and instead of defending its clients against aggression, as before, it could now commit aggressions against them (and against everyone) with comparative impunity. This would be in fact, if not in name, a military takeover. And the result would be, again in fact if not in name, a government—an aggressive bandit government, but a government formed exactly as most of the governments in the history of the world have been formed, by aggression, depredation, and takeover.

Every time a defense agency became that big and powerful (and what would stop it?), it would constitute a *military force*—and ordinary citizens would then be the victims of that military force, and would have to do as it decreed or die; and whether one called that military force an ex-defense-agency, a government, or a gang of bandits would make no difference at all to the lives and destinies of the victims.

2. A LEGAL CODE

The stance I took in the final chapter of my *LIBERTARIANISM* was roughly as follows: private police forces are doubtless much more efficient than those run by government; let us assume for the moment that all such forces are privately owned and operated; but (my question was) *what would they enforce?* They could not, or should not, be permitted to enforce their own whims, or those of their clients—torturing suspects, imprisoning people indefinitely as slave labor, and doing this for "offenses" that they happened to have personal hangups about (e.g., pornography or marijuana possession, or nothing at all), but which according to other people shouldn't be considered crimes. They should be able to enforce only *the law of the land* (local, state, and federal)—a body of law already enacted, and known in advance, so that one would foresee the consequences of any violation. In other words, laws should (I held) be *enacted* by the state, even though the *enforcement* of them might be left to private agencies.

While reading Rothbard on private defense agencies, then, I was anxious to see what would happen when he got to the crucial question "What would the enforcers enforce?" And I was pleased to see that he did not attempt to evade this issue; he hit it head-on, like every other issue he treated; he did indeed believe that "there must be a legal code." But not evading a problem is not the same as solving it, and I am far from satisfied that a solution was achieved. Under the heading "Necessity of a Legal Code" (p.12), Rothbard writes: "A legal code is necessary to lay down precise guidelines for the private courts. If, for example, Court A decides that all redheads are inherently evil and must be punished, it is clear that such decisions are the reverse of libertarian, that such a law would constitute an invasion of the rights of redheads. Hence, any such decision would be *illegal* in terms of libertarian principle, and could not be upheld by the rest of society." (He says 'could not,' but surely he should have written 'ought not'—for it clearly *could* be and *would* be if most people thought

"While reading Rothbard on private defense agencies, I was anxious to see what would happen when he got to the crucial question, 'What would the enforcers enforce?' "

redheads were evil.) The legal code he advocates is, not surprisingly, "the libertarian principle of no aggression against person or property . . ." together with certain rules of evidence and a code of maximum punishment.

Very nice; but what if the majority of the members of the society are not libertarians? How would the Rothbardian legal code—which I too as a libertarian would certainly favor—get accepted? Who would see to it that it did get accepted, and what would empower him (or them) to do this? It would be pleasant to think that there would be one such code, which every judge and jury in the land would enforce. But until all men are libertarians, it seems to me that the idea that there would be just one, and that it would be accepted by all courts, is no more than wishful thinking.

What is surely more likely to happen is this: people with one set of convictions would belong to one defense agency and court system, and people with a different set of convictions would belong to a different agency and court system. Let us say that system A is libertarian, and that system B is not. I belong to system A, and my neighbor belongs to B. I take a nude swim in my pool, and my neighbor, who thinks that nudity is the most heinous of offenses, is morally outraged and decides to prosecute me. I belong to system A in which the act in question is no offense, and no one in my agency prosecutes anyone for such things. But my neighbor belongs to system B, in which nude swimming carries a penalty of twenty years. He calls his defense agency, whose men apprehend me by force and take me to one of Agency B's prisons. A member of my family, seeing me spirited off in one of the Agency B cars, phones Agency A to get me released. At this point there could be open warfare between Agency A and B; or, more likely (since my case would not be that important to either of them), there would be a confrontation between A's representative and B's representative. A would request that I be released ("The act is no crime at all, it is trivial," etc.), but B's representative would say, "*You* may consider it trivial but we don't, at least our clients don't, and it is our clients whom we are representing and from whom we get our business. If I didn't prosecute your man to the limit, I'd lose my business among the rather large segment of the population that has these moral convictions. So forget about the release. I'm not even going to tell you in which of our prisons we have him incarcerated." At this point, the outcome depends on how powerful Agency A is in relation to Agency B, and whether they are willing to fight about it, not being able to agree on the issue.

I am omitting many possible steps and variations, here, which do not change the principle: Agency A takes the matter to its court (or arbitration) system A, Agency B takes the matter to its court system B, and they try to settle the matter through arbitration. Perhaps they agree to have the matter settled by another court that belongs to neither system. But on the other hand perhaps they will not—they feel so strongly about the issue, A about my innocence and B about my guilt, that there is no third party they will agree on: if the court C is sympathetic to A, B will not consent to it, and if it is sympathetic to B, A will not consent. So there again is an impasse. Besides, even if they did consent to have the matter settled by court C, who or what is to ensure that the parties abide by the decision? If agency A is more powerful, and the members of agency B know it, they will probably defer to A in the end because of A's greater power; but if agency B has more weapons, then A will most likely defer to B.

Imagine a defense-agency-cum-arbitration agency, for example, in a segment of the American Bible Belt. This agency, D, will be in a position to clobber any member of the small minority of citizens who do not believe that failure to attend church every Sunday is a criminal act. The victim of such action might belong to a minority defense agency, E, in which case he will try to get E to defend him when members of D arrest him for non-church-attendance; but E will not be very effective against D, which is nearly all-powerful in the area. More likely, there will be no minority defense agency at all, so that the victim will be left to his own devices in trying to defend himself against arrest and conviction by the members of D.

Exactly the same situation would exist in the Deep South if the white majority's agency, F, chose to arrest a member of the black minority, G. Even if G (a defense agency for the blacks) existed, and assuming that the blacks could afford to pay the fees for membership, they would be relatively defenseless against the powerful agency F whose members would swoop down on them on whatever phoney pretext they chose. If a white man were guilty of a murder and his defense agency G wanted to pin the crime on the black man, there would be nothing to stop this from happening.

This is of course the way it is (or was) in the Deep South with government (state and local) law-enforcers. But this is just the point: the law is no better than its enforcers, whether these be employees of

private agencies or officials of the government. And where one agency predominates in a certain area, it would in effect *be* the government: between a private agency so powerful that it could shove other people around, and a municipal or state police force that could do the same thing, there would be very little difference, especially to the victim.

I am not saying, then, that the problem does not exist with government police forces and government courts; I am only saying that the same problem would arise again with nongovernment agencies and courts—unless *the entire society* were so libertarian that they could all agree on the set of rules to be enforced and on the method of their enforcement. And if a society ever arrived at the condition of being that unanimously libertarian, then it might as well have *one* code of law and one set of enforcers—would there be that much difference?

The two "solutions," government law and enforcement and private law and enforcement, both face great difficulties, including some that are the same for both. The situation is reminiscent of a passage in Lewis Carroll's *ALICE IN WONDERLAND:*

"I like the Walrus best," said Alice, "because he was a little sorry for the poor oysters."

"He ate more than the Carpenter, though," said Tweedledee. "You see he held his handkerchief in front, so that the Carpenter couldn't see how many he took; contrariwise."

"That was mean," Alice said indignantly. "Then I like the Carpenter best—if he didn't eat so many as the Walrus."

"But he ate as many as he could get," said Tweedledum.

This was a puzzler. After a pause, Alice began, "Well! They were both very unpleasant characters . . . ." ◻

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dedicated anarchists.

UTILITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS

What then of the utilitarian arguments? First, I must state that for me the claims of morality and justice are so overwhelming that utilitarian questions are of relatively little moment. But even for those libertarians who would weigh the utilitarian more heavily, I would say this: that *usually* in human affairs, the moral and the practical go hand in hand; and, second, that at the very least, you should agree that the moral argument sets up, not indifference, but a heavy presumption on behalf of anarchism.

Now for the specifics. Dr. Hospers, as I have noted, writes as if one private defense agency would inevitably predominate in each geographical area, and then he goes on to say that if *everyone* in the society is libertarian, "then it might as well have *one* code of law and one set of enforcers" as if the former implies the latter? What Dr. Hospers seems to be doing here is to assume implicitly that if firms are producing the same product then there would naturally or automatically be only *one firm* in that particular industry. But this would mean that, say, in the steel industry where many firms might be producing the same grade and type of steel, that there is need for only *one firm.* But this ignores all the virtues of free and active competition that economics teaches us. Many competing steel firms are almost always more efficient than one firm and we can see this truth in industry after industry over the years.

Perhaps Dr. Hospers is maintaining that the defense industry is what economists call a "natural monopoly," so that one firm in a given area will inevitably emerge, and its competitors will all go under. Perhaps, since this result can never be totally ruled out in advance. But I fail to see any reason for this contention. Until recent technological breakthroughs allowing different lines to be carried over one cable, the telephone industry was perhaps the only natural monopoly that we know about. But in the sphere of protection, we are already familiar with the fact that one city or area will have many lawyers, many judges, many insurance companies, and many companies of private guards. Why in the world should they turn out to be a natural monopoly in a totally free market? This contention makes little sense.

Furthermore, *even if* Dr. Hospers' implicit assumption is correct, and defense turns out to be a natural monopoly, it is *still* superior to compulsory monopoly. For economic analysis shows that it is not only *actual* competition that keeps private firms on their toes in the market, but *potential* competition as well. Even if there is only one firm producing a certain product, it is forced to keep its costs down and its quality high because if it fails to do so, another new firm can be created which will take away its customers. Even one single private agency would have to face such potential competition, a competition which is of course outlawed under limited government.

LEGALIZED CRIME

Dr. Hosper's entire case rests on the assumption that

"equally thorny" problems would present themselves to both the anarchist and the limited government solutions. But we have already begun to indicate that the problems with anarchism (obviously no social system short of perfect people would have *no* problems at all) are far fewer because anarchism does not, like limited government, contain within itself a system of legalized crime and aggression. Anarcho-capitalism retains market checks and balances, market competition, and the necessity to serve customers as efficiently as possible. Limited government can contain none of these safeguards. We have already seen that the likelihood of defense and courts being a natural monopoly in which competition would disappear is very low; and that *even* if it were, the potential competition of new firms would still be an ever-present force.

Let us take up Dr. Hospers' other problems in turn. Suppose that a street-owner leaves his streets unguarded? There are two basic types of streets: residential and commercial. If commercial street-owners leave their streets unguarded, who in blazes would go there? The business of the merchants would fall drastically, the stores and offices would move out of these unguarded streets, and the street-owners would be left without revenue. Does Dr. Hospers think this likely to occur? As for residential streets, there would, I am sure, be some householders in a free society who will not welcome visitors; and if their streets are unguarded then they won't be receiving very many. So? Those householders who do wish to receive visitors, on the other hand, will make sure that their streets are protected.

Most of Dr. Hospers' other points boil down to saying that it is *conceivable* that some defense agencies will ignore the desires of their mass of consumers, and either directly become criminal aggressors or put themselves into the service of such aggressors. Certainly that could conceivably happen, given that criminals will continue to exist. But the point is that under archy, we have no safeguards whatever against those criminals who manage to constitute the designated government; under anarcho-capitalism, the mass of victims and consumers could and would hire their own competing agencies to defend them against the predators. And I tried to indicate in my *REASON* article that there are built-in reasons on the free market why defense agencies would tend to arise to supply this demand for legitimate protection. Under anarchism, the noncriminal public would have defenders to turn to against criminal predators; under archy, they have no defense whatever against the compulsory monopoly of government predation.

Under anarchism, moreover, there would be further built-in reasons to expect the victims and their defenders to win out. For, in contrast to the situation where government exists, these predators would have no sense of legitimacy among the public, no built-in support that the State commands for its alleged wisdom, sovereignty, etc. The aggressors would be recognized by all as bandits and treated accordingly. Lacking this sense of legitimacy, and as confirmed by history, it is extremely difficult for a bandit group to create a State anew, once the State does not exist. (It is, on the other hand, easy for bandits to acquire legitimacy by taking over an existing State apparatus.)

The "Russian Question" I think I have adequately dealt with in my *REASON* article.

But *suppose,* suppose anyway, that despite all these vital safeguards and despite its low probability, the bandit gang should at last be able to win out, and to set up a new State apparatus once again. As I wrote in *REASON,* then the worst that has happened is that we are back to archy once more, and, as a libertarian philosopher has stated, "at least the world will have had a glorious holiday." What Karl Marx falsely said about communism thus turns out to be true of anarcho-capitalism: We have nothing to lose but our chains by trying anarchism; we have a world to win.

LIBERTARIAN LEGAL CODE

Dr. Hospers' final strictures about anarchism concern the basic legal code. It is a curious argument; for he says, in effect, after the State has been abolished and we have anarchism, who is to ensure that everyone will adopt the same law code? But in my view, the entire libertarian system *includes:* not only the abolition of the State, *but also* the general adoption of a libertarian law code. Why does Dr. Hospers think that it would be *easier* to abolish the State than to agree on a libertarian law code? He says: "but what if the majority of the members of the society are not libertarians? How would the Rothbardian legal code . . . get accepted?" But it seems clear to me that if the majority of the public are not libertarians, the State will not get abolished either, so in practice there would be little for Dr. Hospers to worry about.

In short, in the present world, there are darned few libertarians, so therefore anarcho-capitalism is in no sense right around the corner. How do we get most people to adopt libertarianism at all—even of the limited archy variety let alone anarchism? This is a question that none of us can fully answer. But the point is that in my view "libertarianism" includes agreeing to a libertarian law code. If most people believe in outlawing nudism, then there is very little we can do about it; but this simply means that most people have not yet become libertarians. The greater the number of libertarians, the more likely that libertarianism will be adopted. The lower the number, the less likely. For Dr. Hospers' argument to have any validity at all, he would have to show that it is

significantly easier to convince people to abolish the State than to let nudists alone (or abandon other examples of dictation). In my view, if we have convinced the bulk of the population to abolish the State, then they have undoubtedly been convinced already that the aggressions that the State commits (e.g., invading the rights of nudists or redheads) are immoral violations of liberty and private property. For on what *other* basis can we convince them to abolish their révered government apparatus?

Furthermore, to clarify my view of the legal code, gaining general libertarian acceptance would not be as difficult as Dr. Hospers believes. In my view, the legal code can be separated into two parts: (a) the basic libertarian code, which prohibits aggression against persons and private property, and which is fundamental to the libertarian position; and (b) institutional matters (e.g., whether decisions are made by judges or juries) which are not matters of libertarian doctrine and which could therefore be made the subject of free competition between the courts. It is only the basic code which protects individual rights that needs to be adopted by all the courts. And that, as I've said, is a vital part of what libertarianism is all about in the first place.

DEALING WITH "CONSENT"

Finally, Dr. Hospers raises the matter of "consent" and states that I do not deal with it. Here, we are confronted with a problem inherent in any excerpting of a chapter from a larger book; the chapter preprinted by *REASON* deals only with private vs. public defense. A fuller exposition of my political philosophy, which provides my answers to these questions, can be found elsewhere in the book. To boil them down, I see no reason whatever why anyone should worry about the consent of criminals to their just punishment. I believe that nothing should be done to anyone without his consent, *except* for the just punishment of criminals who have already violated the "consent," the person or property, of their victims. There are indeed, as Dr. Hospers indicates, two sets of people who may decide not to use private police or courts in an anarchist society. One group is the pacifists who do not believe in punishment or defensive violence; in my view, pacifists should be entitled to act on their views (which they cannot now under archy) and simply not pursue or place charges against criminals who have injured them. I do not agree with their view of violence, but I also believe that they have the perfect right *not* to defend themselves if they don't want to. Second are those victims who wish to pursue their aggressors themselves, without delegating their rights of defense to any private agency. Fine, too; except that these private avengers will realize that, if they go too far in their enthusiasm, and either punish the wrong people or execute someone for stealing an apple, then *their* victims will have the right to prosecute them in the courts. *Most* people will undoubtedly prefer to rely for their defense on the private courts, for two reasons: (a) because of the virtues of specialization and the division of labor—private police and courts will be more efficient defenders than the victims themselves; and (b) because the court decisions will have greater legitimacy and acceptance among the public as a whole. ◻

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On Rejecting Human Rights

by Tibor R. Machan

It is commonly assumed by those who believe in individualism that it is in one's self-interest to respect the rights of others. Is it possible that one can espouse individualism, yet at the same time assert a case against human rights? In analyzing this question, REASON *Associate Editor Tibor R. Machon, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at State University College, Fredonia, New York, offers his views on the paramount significance of human rights.*

Not much more than a year ago a new attack on human rights has been launched, this time from a very unlikely source. Most people are aware of the usual rejections of human rights: they are social and political principles by which capitalists gain but workers suffer, they cannot be proven to exist, we never never agree on what human nature is, they restrain the law so that it cannot serve a growing society, etc., etc. Most of those who deny that there are human rights clearly *reject individualism and egoism.* That is just their point against human rights—if a legal system implements them and if governments protect and preserve them, people will be able to seek after what they want, without having to pay dues to everyone.

But the most recent attack is different. The only thing close to it in political thought is Max Stirner, a thoroughly *subjectivist* individualist. The idea is that *a consistent individualist, acting in terms of ethical egoism, has to reject that his actions ought to be guided by considerations of what others have a right to.* That would be, the argument runs, to violate one's ethics—not to act only on the basis of what is in one's best interest. To yield to the edicts of human rights would be to concern oneself with what is in the interest of others.

EXAMPLE PRESENTED

The argument is given support by the following example: suppose I encounter a drunk in a dark alley, sprawled on the ground; the drunk is loaded with cash and my interest would at this time be well served if I could purchase something for which I do not have the money; I know the drunk cannot prevent me or retaliate; is it not clear that it is in my self-interest to take the money and simply disappear? It must be.

To look at this a bit more closely it would be nice to have a detailed argument to refer to. Unfortunately the people who have advanced these views have not put out anything quite cogent enough to grapple with. I have seen little two-page essays here and there, found myself under attack at this or that meeting I attended for defending human rights, and have heard of private lectures being given proclaiming that human rights are "spooky" or "mythical." In view of this, my own tactic will be to take on just the above and give a very brief defense of the compatibility—no, interdependence—of human rights and ethical egoism. (A far more extensive discussion may be found in my forthcoming book on human rights as well as in Professor Eric Mack's paper, "Egoism and Rights" in *THE PERSONALIST,* Fall 1972.)

In brief when the argument we just encountered denies that it is in one's self interest to act in terms of what the moral/political principles we call human rights require. If we recall that those who advance the argument are anarchists, this makes a bit better sense. For anarchists there cannot be any political principles—for a consistent anarchist, politics is immoral. So political principles must be flawed—or designed to serve the goal of evil.

IMPORTANCE OF "CONTEXT"

The example which supports this argument already shows the rejection of politics. No mention is made of the political context—the broad context of life in which one's encounter with others, drunk or not, must be understood, in order to formulate the sort of conduct which will benefit oneself. If, for example, the drunk has his money marked and chemically identified with me after I take it, I will not likely be able to learn if he can retaliate. If he has an army waiting just around the block—or just a very big and nasty dog sitting nearby watching over the master—my rational self interest is far from being served by my move to take the money he has on him. Whatever the wider social, technological, economic circumstances are will have to figure into the answer to "What is in my best interest concerning that money sticking out of this drunk's pocket?" Let me enlarge on this a bit.

To act rationally toward others, we need to know something about them. We would be well off to know that others are agents and can acquire things on their own, without having to hurt anyone. This will inform us of the fact that people get attached to what they have acquired—first discovered, created, traded, etc. From all this it seems quite reasonable to conclude that if others are rational, they will act to insure what is theirs, to protect against those who would take it either by accident or intentionally. As we proceed to act towards others in the most rational way available to us—based on numerous valid generalizations and lots of details—the above data will make a difference to what is or is not rational action. Rational people will guard against potential threats to either life or acquired items, property. They know that people are free to be irrational, to evade that something belongs to one, another thing to another. So they will do the best to make the effects of such irrationality as minimal as possible, given the circumstances.

It is true that in many societies people do not do this systematically. Some don't do it at all. In some places like communes, there is such closeness among people that no help from outsiders is ever needed to secure decent conditions, to insure against violations of self interest. Mutual self interest is very directly tied to the self interest of individuals. (But even though, most communes fail even more dismally than larger societies.)

GENERAL APPROACH TO LIFE

Now if we reconsider the example, what is its problem? Once we know that in society people will, on the whole, act to ensure against those who will not abide by the fact that this belongs to one, that to another person, the drunk's money won't even appear to be so accessible to me. Granted I may not be caught. Granted that even if the drunk or his friends catch me, I can fight back successfully. Yet, as a generalized approach to life, I am better off living by taking only that which no one has claimed or someone is willing to part with to me.

Human rights identify social conditions that are good for people because they are people. Their human nature requires them. In this human rights are standards of conduct derived from the nature of man—only they pertain to a social context. They are politically basic—as certain principles are basic in physics but not in metaphysics, or basic in organic chemistry but not in chemistry as such. Human rights are not ethically, only politically basic.

There is no politics for anarchists. So these standards are inconsistent for them, what with their commitment to antipolitics. The concession that human rights are standards of political conduct would lead to the question: how do we best insure that we abide by them, so that we can engage in the purposes of human community, peaceful, mutual development of our lives in each other's company (division of labor)? Well, we could organize and hire some people to supervise the venture. If people do not abide by the requirements that make it possible (and to their interest as well as ours), we remove them for a while, throw them out of the community, etc. And the agent that will do it will have to be kept extremely good at his job so he does not, like a bad doctor, injure the client more than help him.

Just how people might do this is precisely the issue of political theory (Cf. *IN DEFENSE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY* by Jeffrey H. Reiman, a Harper Torchbook that responds to Robert Paul Wolff's *IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM*). But an anarchist cannot admit that this is possible. So he needs first to deny that human rights exist around which such a scheme might be organized.

"LIFE BOAT" CASES

Obviously there will be occasions when the standard of political viability must be violated. Political principles, those standards by which we ought to conduct ourselves in a human community we joined voluntarily, derive from more basic ethical standards. The principle of justice toward others as the best means by which to establish mutually beneficial relations among men, derives from the most basic human value of rationality. And when the conditions do not exist where justice could exist, it becomes pointless to say that there are cases when justice must yield to some

other values. In short, the "life boat" cases of ethical and moral dilemma simply tell us that human rights are inapplicable, not that they have to be violated on moral grounds. Obviously if one *cannot* do something, it is silly to ask him to; it is especially silly to identify it as his moral responsibility.

One of the advantages of a contextual approach to human understanding and knowledge is that we can justify by it our confidence that people have the capacity to respond rationally to unknown, unanticipated situations. So while we cannot generate principles for "life boat" cases, that is just their point: they are the stress cases, the borderline cases, which all fields of knowledge from physics to ethics exhibit; neither need we say that they are unmanagable. People are active agents, capable of generating answers to questions that have not arisen before. Only passive beings require some ready-made formula for every eventuality—some instinct, commandment, authority. The egoistic ethics that gives rise to the political theory of a free society, and human rights, has nothing much to do with that—even if some people labeling themselves libertarians say to the contrary. (We all have to make our considered judgments as to whether to accept when someone identifies himself as this or that. Surely he has the capacity to make a mistake about *that,* too.)

A final note. Among those who reject human rights are some calling themselves anarcho-capitalist or capitalists. That self-identification makes no sense. With the rejection of human rights—and property rights—must go any adherence to capitalism, free market economics, laissez-faire or the like. Without the general standard of human rights, how would one identify what belongs to whom, whose privacy includes this property, what may someone trade off as he wishes, etc. All these essential aspects of what makes capitalism viable get wiped out with human rights gone!

The fact is that in human history, human rights theory came up with the best solution to man's political problems. It answered the question: By what standards of conduct can a human community be successful? To reject this in the name of self-interest is a travesty. ◻

The case for "the idea whose time has come" . . .



LIBERTARIANISM

BY JOHN HOSPERS, PH.D., DIRECTOR, SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

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COMMITTEE FOR THE

ANTI-INFLATION AMENDMENT

To the Constitution of the United States

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> Section 1: IT SHALL BE THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TO STABILIZE BY LAW THE SUPPLY OF MONEY IN CIRCULATION, AND THEREBY TO PRESERVE AND INCREASE THE PURCHASING POWER OF THE CURRENCY OF THE UNITED STATES.

This policy could be accomplished in a number of ways. The precise way chosen would be up to the Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve System. Among the ways would be either using the commodity price of gold, or any group of commodities, as a base price, or by fixing the quantity of money, or the rate of monetary expansion, by law.

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This idea was first suggested by Milton Friedman. All it says is that consumers deserve the lowest prices possible, and the government should not obstruct competition in any way.

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

science fiction in perspective

JOHN J PIERCE

John Pierce's Science Fiction column alternates monthly in REASON *with Davis Keeler's Money column.*

Once upon a time, in a house by the side of a canyon at 8776 Lookout Mountain Avenue, there lived an obscure (to most of the world) young author who jokingly called himself the Hermit of Hollywood.

On the wall of his study, there hung a chart—"an outlined and graphed history of the future with characters, dates of major discoveries, et cetera plotted in." [1] Nothing like it had been seen before.

The author, of course, was Robert A. Heinlein and the chart—or, at least, a later version of it—can be seen in the opening pages of any book in his "future history" series—*THE MAN WHO SOLD THE MOON, THE GREEN HILLS OF EARTH, REVOLT IN 2100* and *METHUSELAH'S CHILDREN.*

Heinlein's chart came into being around 1940—a year that now seems remote, both to the world at large and the world of science fiction. Atomic energy, space travel, and "future shock" were unheard of, except in science fiction—and science fiction itself was virtually unheard of.

These were the days when John W. Campbell Jr. was first struggling to make a "pulp" fiction into something respectable, and when the authors were still struggling to keep writing through such expedients as the Manana Literary Society (Anthony Boucher captures the spirit of the time, and some of its leading personalities, in his 1942 mystery novel, *ROCKET TO THE MORGUE*).

The pay was bad, but Heinlein and the rest had a lot of fun. And while they were at it, they made science fiction into a serious form of speculative literature.

Not that they would ever let on—except among themselves—but after Hiroshima and the V-2, they found themselves having to make fewer and fewer excuses for their peculiar profession.

Heinlein's "future history" stories and novels are now rated among the "classics" of what was once called the Golden Age of *ASTOUNDING,* the magazine where most of them originally appeared. The world has gone on to other things, and so has Heinlein. Or has he?

STORIES TO BE TOLD

Careful reading of the left hand column in his chart will disclose titles of several "stories to be told"—in parentheses. None of them had been written by the early 1950's, when Heinlein assembled his shorter-than-novel length fiction between hard covers, nor even in 1958, when the book version of his 1941 serial, *METHUSELAH'S CHILDREN,* was finally published.

Heinlein felt it necessary to explain why some of them—"The Sound of His Wings," "Eclipse" and "The Stone Pillow"—hadn't been written, and what they would have been about, in an endpaper to *REVOLT IN 2100.* But there remained an enigmatic reference, at the very bottom of the chart, to something called *DA CAPO.*

DA CAPO has now been written. Only the new title is *TIME ENOUGH FOR LOVE,* and the concept of the novel has (apparently) been elaborated far beyond what Heinlein first intended, more than 30 years ago, when he was still the Hermit of Hollywood. It is scheduled for publication this month (May) by G. P. Putnam's Sons.

It may be a masterpiece, a disaster, or something in between—but it will be important.

Heinlein is emotionally a Middle American, intellectually a free thinker. This has always been both the strength and weakness of his work. At its best, his fiction combines a human warmth and intimacy unmatched nearly anywhere else in the genre with a highly imaginative, yet realistic, exploration of the possibilities of the future. At its worst, it can degenerate into mere folksiness, or the emotional and intellectual commitments can clash jarringly.

The worst was painfully evident in his last novel, *I WILL FEAR NO EVIL,* where his intellectual commitment to the idea of sexual liberation ran up against his ingrained Middle American values to produce a work that lacked either intellectual or emotional vigor. The fact that Heinlein was seriously ill when he wrote it didn't help any.

When Heinlein began writing, sex wasn't a big issue in science fiction—little attention was given it, at least in the explicit sense. Much has been said of the "puritanism" of the pulps—although the instant acceptance of Philip Jose Farmer's "The Lovers" in 1952 may indicate that the reader puritanism so long feared by editors was a paper tiger.

Even then, some of Heinlein's Middle American crotchets—such as a longing for personal immortality (see *BEYOND THIS HORIZON*) marred his work. But the "future history" series (he didn't call it that; Campbell applied the name) was free of such obsessions, at least in

the narrow sense, and was pioneering both in its concept and in its execution.

As far back as H. G. Wells, there had been stories set in a single future society *WHEN THE SLEEPER WAKES,* "A Story of the Days to Come," "A Dream of Armageddon"). Olaf Stapledon, in 1931, created a vast—but impersonal—panorama of the possible future of mankind in *LAST AND FIRST MEN.* (Wells followed in 1933 with a dreary, short-range pseudo-sociological history called *THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME.)*

SERIES OF STORIES

But Heinlein was the first to create a series of stories, set in different times, with different characters, but all part of a common future that grows with each story. The technique has been widely adopted since by future historians as mythological as Cordwainer Smith, or as fanciful as Larry Niven.

Heinlein's major stories in the series were not merely consecutive, but functionally related. Events, technological innovations, sociological trends in one story influenced those in later ones. Always concerned with educating the public about the impact of the future (as witness his later "juvenile" novels, which really rank among his more mature works), he seems to have had an idea in the back of his mind about history as an educational process.

Early stories in the series—"The Roads Must Roll," "Blowups Happen," "The Man Who Sold The Moon"—fall into what Heinlein called the Crazy Years, a "period of semantic disorientation and mass hysteria" [2] brought about by the rapid pace of change. Thirty years before Alvin Toffler's *FUTURE SHOCK,* Heinlein was projecting, in the serial version of *METHUSELAH'S CHILDREN,* such 1959 headlines as "California Raises Voting Age to 41—Rioting on Berkeley Campus." [3]

It was this mass insecurity in face of revolutionary technological change that Heinlein saw as leading to the rise late in the century of Rev. Nehemiah Scudder, the television evangelist of the never-written "The Sound of His Wings" who established the theocratic dictatorship overthrown later in "If This Goes On . . . ." The "false dawn" of space travel, abandoned during the theocracy, was suggested in "Logic of Empire," and would have been dealt with more explicitly in "Eclipse."

Heinlein was influenced at the time by Alfred Korzybski's General Semantics, and the possibility of applying it to a science of "social psychodynamics" was explored in both "If This Goes On . . . ." and *METHUSELAH'S CHILDREN.* Scudder's theocracy used social psychodynamics to control the populace (as in George Orwell's *1984*, published later). The framers of the Covenant meant to apply it more creatively, to prevent the mass psychological upsets and insecurities that led to Scudder's rise.

LIBERTARIAN INTEREST

That Heinlein's interest in libertarian societies dates back much further than *THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS* is shown in "Coventry," where, under the principles of General Semantics, the only crime is committing provable "damage" to another and criminals have the choice of exile or treatment at a "psychodynamic" clinic to have their violent tendencies cured.

In *METHUSELAH'S CHILDREN,* we learn that "custom" is the basis of individual freedom. Public places are under constant surveillance by police, and citizens are registered—all for purposes of crime control. Yet freedom is respected by custom, simply because the populace has accepted the idea psychologically. At first, this may seem absurd—but what ever enforced the freedoms of the British constitution but custom? And how much does mass psychological insecurity—rather than conspiracy—contribute to the contemporary rise of statism?

Heinlein realized that for a libertarian society to work, men had to become civilized—to overcome the tribal and barbarian passions of the past that created a ready social climate for intolerance, persecution and totalitarianism. In *METHUSELAH'S CHILDREN,* man wasn't civilized enough yet—the knowledge of the existence of "long lifers" produced yet another outburst of jealousy and mass hysteria.

The flight of the "long lifers" in a stolen starship, their encounter with alien intelligences more advanced than our own, and their eventual return to an Earth ready to accept them because it has "discovered" the "secret" of longevity they never had, form the background for *DA CAPO,* which was to have described "Civil disorder, followed by the end of human adolescence and beginning of first mature culture." [4]

For years, Heinlein kept 100 pages of notes for *DA CAPO,* which in 1967 he hinted was to deal with the "further adventures of Lazarus Long" (a key figure in Methuselah's Children) and "tie up the loose ends" in the "future history" series. [5] But the notes lay idle on his desk until—it must have been just after he wrote *I WILL FEAR NO EVIL*—he finally decided to use them in a novel.

STARTLING REVELATIONS

But *TIME ENOUGH FOR LOVE,* obviously, is a far different novel than *DA CAPO* would have been in the 1940's. George Ernsberger, editor at Berkley Books (Putnam's paperback line) has read it, and while he doesn't know the "future history" series in enough detail to judge how well *TIME ENOUGH FOR LOVE* fits into it, he does have some startling revelations. [6]

The vast (250,000 words) work covers 26 centuries in the life of Lazarus Long, as recounted in his memoirs—ranging from visits to far planets to a time-travel trip to his childhood home, where he falls in love with his mother (the sexual liberation element is similar to that in *I WILL FEAR NO EVIL,* but "not as obsessive," according to Ernsberger).

Less argumentative than most of Heinlein's recent work, Ernsberger says, the novel is concerned more with the nature and destiny of man than with politics and economics as such—although there is a background that involves the spread of humanity across the galaxy and the establishment of independent sub-cultures of many planets to suit different tastes. There is "little commerce" among the planets, much less a common government.

Genetics seems to be a "controlling consideration," according to Ernsberger—incestuous marriages are all right as long as they don't produce defective offspring, while Heinlein (or at least Long) is all for elimination of the "economically incompetent" for eugenic reasons. The reliance on "custom and tradition" in ordering society seems to be carried on from *METHUSELAH'S CHILDREN.*

A "huge and energetic book," *TIME ENOUGH FOR LOVE* is less a novel than a series of interlinked stories—some as adventurous as the early Heinlein works. "This book has the feeling of a valedictory," Ernsberger says. "He broke out of traditional structure as if he wanted to get every last thing into it, whether it fit or not."

Yet Ernsberger considers it a far better book than *I WILL FEAR NO EVIL.* Heinlein seems to have worked out the

problems that obsessed him in that book, he believes—now they can be part of the natural background of *TIME ENOUGH FOR LOVE.*

Well, the rest of us will see for ourselves soon enough. As the culmination of a series none of us ever expected to see completed, it is all the more important to us that Heinlein's new novel succeed. So let's keep our fingers crossed—after all, it was after the dismal failures of *PODKAYNE OF MARS* and *FARNHAM'S FREEHOLD* that he produced *THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS.*

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] John W. Campbell, editorial *ASTOUNDING,* February 1941.
[2] "Methuselah's Children" in *ASTOUNDING,* July 1941.
[3] *IBID.*
[4] Lower right in "future history" chart.
[5] Personal conversation, 1967.
[6] Personal conversation, 19 January 1972.

book review

Reviewed by Tim O. Ozenne

THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST: Economic Theory and Legal Cases. By D. T. Armentano. New Rochelle: Arlington House. 1972. Pp. 287. $11.95.

Adam Smith understood quite clearly the evils of monopoly, and every freshman economics student is expected to learn the litany now made elegant by line graphs of marginal revenue, average revenue and marginal cost. Hence, a law which casts monopolists into fire and brimstone is almost as widely beloved among economists as laws against theft.

In *MYTHS,* Armentano means to destroy public confidence in the benevolence of antitrust policy. His attack is really two-pronged. First, he raises the fundamental question of whether *any* antitrust legislation or policy can be consistent with the notion of freedom of choice and market competition: If buyers prefer the wares of a monopolist to those of his would-be competitors, what ethical principle drives us to the conclusion that these buyers would be better off if the monopolist were legally barred from making such attractive offers? Second, Armentano addresses a more "practical" question: What evidence exists that actual antitrust policy has resulted in economic gains?

Armentano seems to realize that few persons favorably disposed towards antitrust in principle will be dissuaded from *their* philosophical position, for he devotes only a small portion of the book to examining the ethics of antitrust policy. After pointing out the fundamental inconsistency of first endorsing free market competition and next advocating laws prohibiting competition resulting in monopoly, Armentano turns to look at the empirical evidence to see whether one can show that antitrust is in the "public interest." Presumably, if there is no *evidence* of important social benefits from antitrust enforcement, one cannot possibly rationalize interference in market processes.

The general reader will find Armentano's review of the enforcement of antitrust enlightening. He successfully debunks the notion that governmental intervention to "correct" market structure has produced demonstrable improvement in economic performance in the "corrected" market. *MYTHS* should be read by students of antitrust if only because Armentano brings to light material typically excluded from standard discussions of the antitrust cases. (The standard works generally focus on the "legal" statement of policy or the "theory" adopted by the Court.) In most instances, it would appear that the results of the decisions work against the public interest. This finding conforms to a law enunciated by Procter Thomson: Bad economics make bad ethics.

While *MYTHS* is a scholarly work, it seems directed primarily at persons whose knowledge of economics is relatively unsophisticated. The exposition is entirely verbal (no recourse to mathematics or even geometry) and includes an introductory chapter on the theory of the market system. But consider the following passage from Chapter 2:

> If all producers' outputs were so small that each had no effect on market price, then all producers take as given the one and only market price determined by general supply and demand forces. Individual prices higher than market price were not possible; individual prices lower than market price were foolish and irrational. Hence, market price became the individual demand curve facing each firm and was a horizontal line at every possible output level. (p. 28)

Since Armentano hasn't defined, say, a demand curve, the reader must be assumed to understand such concepts. Most of the book can be appreciated, however, if one is but vaguely familiar with economic jargon and principles.

The major weakness of this book is Armentano's failure to provide us with an explicit "new" theory to replace the classical theories (of competition and its dependency on market structure). The theories—or perhaps more correctly, perspectives— of Joseph Schumpeter and Edward Chamberlin are cited, but it is unclear that Armentano means to embrace one or the other. Granted that the "competitive model" has been misused in mounting attacks on *open* market monopoly, do we really need to discard the model?

And in favor of what? The relevancy of Armentano's empirical evidence depends on the theory one has of economic behavior, and he has not made the "correct" theory explicit. Before Armentano "converts" many economists he shall have to pay greater detail to the theoretical foundation of his position. Nevertheless, *MYTHS* represents a forage into an area of public policy too commonly presumed to be at worst benign; if Armentano is correct, the denial of property rights to would-be monopolists is not justified by gains in social welfare.

Dr. Ozenne recently received his Ph.D. in economics from UCLA where he studied under Prof. Sam Peltzman. He currently works as an economist for a California think tank.

movies

REVIEWED BY
CHARLES BARR

• Ross Hunter's new musical remake of **LOST HORIZON** is a dull epic, full of incongruities and barren stretches in which nothing much happens. The only good part of the movie is the first half hour, during which members of a relief mission escape a band of guerillas in Southeast Asia, only to be hijacked and flown to a remote area of northern China. The style and tone of this part of the film is reminiscent of Ross Hunter's earlier epic, *AIRPORT*. The movie begins falling apart when the group reaches Shangri-la, an "ideal society" cut off from the rest of civilization. In this seeming paradise, the sun shines warmly all year around, disease is unknown, and nearly everyone lives to a ripe old age. Society is divided into two broad classes: a mass of happy, simple-minded peasants who perform the manual labor, and a group of monks who govern Shangri-la and devote their lives to intellectual and religious contemplation. Socially, it resembles Plato's conception of a country ruled by "philosopher-kings," and the fact that it seems so stagnant and lifeless may say something about the practicality of such benevolent dictatorships. Galt's Gulch it's not. The sense of being in some exotic foreign land is destroyed by Burt Bacharach's bouncy score and the banal lyrics of Hal David. The incongruities of the script and awkward musical transitions make it impossible to judge the performances fairly; the actors seem to struggle along as best they can. None of the characters is fully developed, and motivations are often impossible to decipher. Peter Finch attempts to be thoughtful, but comes off instead as weak and indecisive. Michael York, as Finch's younger brother who wants to escape, seems to be the most intelligent person in the film. Sally Kellerman is frantic as a suicidal war correspondent, Liv Ullmann uninteresting as the schoolteacher. Olivia Hussey registers well as a Shangri-la native with a fatal desire to discover the real world. The musical sequences range from spectacular to corny, mostly the latter. With different premises and more conflict, *LOST HORIZON* might have succeeded, but as it stands it's chiefly valuable as a cure for insomnia. Rated "G".

• **SLITHER** is an insane movie, an adventure-comedy populated by such kooky characters that it's often hard to concentrate on the plot, which is alternately hilarious and suspenseful. James Caan, in a departure from his violent role in *THE GODFATHER,* plays an ex-convict attempting to trace some money embezzled by one of his prison buddies, since deceased. His erstwhile cohorts are Sally Kellerman, a freaked-out blonde with a passion for the beach and for armed robbery; Peter Boyle, the embezzler's partner who's an outdoor enthusiast; and Louise Lasser, Boyle's wife, who once had a high-school crush on Caan. On their way to recover the money, the four encounter a succession of equally offbeat people and events, and are pursued by a mysterious (and appropriately frightening) black van, culminating in a wild chase scene. The performers play their freaky roles to the hilt, keeping the film moving at a fast pace. The script by W. D. Richter is full of clever dialogue, and has some fun with the audience in the opening scenes: For about 15 minutes, it's impossible to tell when the events are taking place. At first it seems like the 1930's, then the 1940's, then the early 1950's. It all occurs so naturally that it takes the audience a while to realize it's being conned. But it's all good, mostly clean fun. Rated "PG".

• **THE THIEF WHO CAME TO DINNER** is a sometimes amusing, sometimes flat crime caper film with just enough inventiveness to keep it from becoming tedious. Ryan O'Neal stars as a computer programmer who abandons the world of "corporate crime" to become a burglar because, as he puts it, it's "more honest." Jacqueline Bisset, his partner in crime and other events, walks through her part without a trace of visible emotion. Warren Oates creates an effective and sympathetic character as Ryan O'Neal's nemesis, a hapless but dedicated insurance investigator. Like most films of its type, *THE THIEF WHO CAME TO DINNER* has a gimmick. Each time O'Neal commits a burglary, he leaves a chessman as his trademark. This earns him the nickname of the "chess burglar," and eventually evolves into a battle of wits with the chess editor of the local newspaper, who challenges him to a match. Austin Pendleton is delightful as the temperamental, prima donna chess editor, Zukovsky. The remainder of the plot is fairly predictable, and the film's cool detachment inhibits anything more than superficial audience involvement. *THE THIEF WHO CAME TO DINNER* is a pleasant diversion, and nothing more. Rated "PG".

James Caan attempts to disarm a flipped-out Sally Kellerman in the suspense comedy SLITHER, as Louise Lasser watches.

libertarian party correspondent—

Post election activity of the Libertarian Party has centered around the organizational efforts of the thirty affiliated state parties. State organizations from Alaska to New York are laying the groundwork for a greater impact on the political process in 1974.

Less than one year ago 89 delegates met in Denver at the first national convention of the Libertarian Party. Indicative of the subsequent growth of the Party was the first statewide convention of the Libertarian Party of California (LPC), held March 9-11 in Fresno. Because of its significance to the national party I am devoting the majority of this report to that convention.

The California convention was marked by the same enthusiasm evident at the Denver gathering last June. Present were 115 delegates representing 18 of the 20 regions into which the LPC is divided. This meeting possessed, however, an additional element of purposefulness, a kind of quiet confidence on the part of the delegates that did not exist at this time last year. The numerous successes of the past year have apparently convinced many LP members that the public is indeed ready to listen to a rational alternative to the major political parties.

Of interest to libertarians nationally is an initiative petition that the California Party will attempt to get on the ballot in 1974. After discussing possible initiatives on victimless crimes, tax reduction and getting minority parties on the ballot, the Convention selected the idea of placing a time limit on most laws. While the details have yet to be worked out, by requiring the legislature to re-pass laws after they have been on the books 10 or 15 years the initiative would have the effect of disposing of many laws while significantly limiting the time available to our busy bureaucrats to pass new ones.

On the last day of the Convention delegates listened to speeches by libertarian dignitaries John Hospers and Antony Sutton. Hospers spoke on the "Libertarian temperament", identifying it as a creative one interested in changing man's environment and contrasting it to the insecure, defensive temperaments of bureaucrats and most academicians. Sutton, a recent convert to libertarianism who is the author of *WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT*, identified all "producers" as potential allies of libertarians and encouraged the delegates to find a common area of agreement when discussing libertarianism with a "non-believer", then point out the consistency of the rest of our beliefs.

In other business, the Libertarian Party of California adopted a Constitution providing for a decentralized organization that places responsibility for growth at the local level. Dues will be split equally between the state and its regional subdivisions.

Los Angeles attorney Ed Clark (National LP Vice Chairman) was elected Chairman of the LPC with Bill White and your LP correspondent being chosen as Vice Chairmen for the northern and southern halves of the state, respectively. California now has over 400 members in the state party and if the state convention was any indication it can be expected that this Party will be a major factor in California politics before the end of the decade.

STATE PARTY REPORTS

ALASKA. John Hospers reports back from his recent trip to the Alaskan state convention that there is more enthusiasm for libertarianism among the general populus in that state than in any other he visited. Hospers says the LP is very well organized in the state and that it is looking into the possibility of supporting a growing Alaskan secession movement.

ARIZONA. Freeman Fox deserves considerable credit for helping get this state party organized to the point where it is one of the most active in the nation.

CALIFORNIA. Roger Scime is a candidate for Los Angeles Junior College District Board of Trustees. He is running on a libertarian platform which includes calling for the sale of various academic departments within the junior colleges to private companies so they can run them.

NEW YORK. The Free Libertarian Party will hold its annual convention March 30-April 1 at the Williams Club on East 39th Street. The FLP phone number is (212)354-0292. The Party's monthly newsletter "Free Libertarian" is excellent and subscriptions may be obtained by writing to FLP, Inc., 15 West 38th Street, New York, New York 11018.

OHIO. The OLP is working on arrangements for the national LP Convention which will be held June 7-10 in Strongsville. Kay Harroff reports that OLP membership is over 50 and growing fast.

OKLAHOMA. The Libertarian City Committee of Norman is running a candidate for the Norman City Council. Steven Browne, a 21-year anthropology major at the University of Oklahoma. Browne is running as an avowed laissez-faire capitalist who wants to severely curtail city government and taxes.

OREGON. Hospers ran 5th in Oregon, ahead of the two socialists and Gus Hall. The Oregon Newsletter reports the following electoral college vote: Hospers 1; Others 537. The Oregon LP has the benefit of receiving advice from the first woman in the history of the United States to get an electoral vote, LP Vice-Presidential candidate Tonie Nathan.

TEXAS. TLP newsletter "Renaissance News" reports that the first annual ILS (Institute for Libertarian Studies) Seminar Conference will be held in Dallas April 21st. Guy Story Brown reports that interest in the seminar is very high and it is hoped that individuals from all parts of the country will attend. For more information write to Mr. Brown c/o TLP, 802 East Elwood, Irvine, Texas 75061.

NOTES

Roger MacBride, new folk hero of the LP, was in Los Angeles recently. As the Virginia elector who cast his electoral vote for John Hospers, LP Presidential candidate, MacBride's presence enabled the LP to receive coverage from the *LOS ANGELES TIMES* at long last . . . . State LP parties should send newsletter items to me at the following address: Reason Reports c/o LPC, PO Box 71383, Los Angeles, California 90071 . . . .

Ed Crane

foreign correspondent

BRITISH TORY PARTY CONFERENCE—1972

London, England

The Prime Minister's conversion to socialism could well be termed Heath-in-reverse, if one cares to remember his 1970 election promises of a freer and more competitive society. The bonds which now unite the Tory Party are the same as those which have united the Labour Party for so long—envy, hatred and malice towards riches, talent and personal independence. The main differences being, the socialists know why they are supporting such measures. As for the Tories attending the Blackpool Conference, they dozed off in their seats, apparently unaware of Ministers performing a volte-face, only to pull themselves together at the end of each speech to applaud and vote for the said motion.

Here are a few examples which demonstrate the incredible inconsistencies and mental confusion which characterized the October conference. The resolution in favour of the entry of Ugandan Asians was carried by a majority of two to one. But this inconsistency was no more telling than when an ovation was given to one delegate for his ambiguous speech, dubiously supporting compulsory sterilization of Asian immigrants!

The debate on Ulster raged against the Government until Willy Whitelaw (alias Wesley Mooch) Minister for Northern Ireland, delivered an appalling speech of sweet nothings which brought most delegates to their feet in passionate support of they knew not what.

At a special meeting Robert Carr, Home Secretary, addressed a group of Conservative left-wing students. In his true hard-hitting style he proclaimed that it was our duty to help people help themselves, and the way to achieve this with our poorer neighbours was to substantially increase our foreign aid. That we were still a power to be recognized as having a heart, and one of the few countries to achieve the minimum rate of aid proscribed by that bastion of integrity and fairness—the United Nations.

Later in the conference hall Mr. Carr, speaking on Law, Order and Pornography, stated: "I am opposed to censorship but we must clear away the excesses such as public displays on book stalls, cinema and television."

The next session raised the question of trade. As one minister so succinctly put it, "Free trade—never! The rest of the world won't agree to it—how can we be expected to? Foreign labour would bring about a rise in the unemployment figures. The Uganda Asians, well that is a different matter. They are on the whole morally robust, thrifty, enterprising and self-evidently independent people." Is that the reason that the government is buying houses for them and that families are receiving something like £28 a week in benefits (over six times the old age pension) till March 1973 by which time it is assumed they will be comfortably settled in. For someone who does not believe in racial discrimination, Mr. Carr's speech does not ring true. However he did convince me that it was an expensive way to buy votes.

As the platitudes washed over the audience in a succession of boring debates one could easily be forgiven for wondering if this was not a Tory conference in England but instead a seminar on brotherly love sponsored by the Kremlin. This nightmare image was soon overtaken by reality and took the form of Mr. John Selwyn, MP and Vice Chairman of the Party. He accused the party of being too boring and added, "We have to wear our hearts on our sleeves a great deal more than we have done, because if we don't people will believe that we have no heart at all." Heaven forbid! But nevertheless free marketeers, take heart, it was done in the name of compassion not reason.

The debate on industry also omitted any mention of reason. For this one the Tories pulled out of their home spun top hat the Labour Manifesto, a shining example of that bag of promises labelled "We Care Too!" It included no less than wide-spread grants, regional employment premiums, growth points and grey areas. One was not able to find out what all these terms meant, but the government has assured us that a Special Ministry has been set up to deal with any ambiguities that may arise. When John Davies, then Ministry of Industry, who has had more conversions than most politicians, was reminded of his commitment to disentangle industry from government; he answered in true blue style and side stepped the question altogether. His advocacy of massive regional subsidies and of state direction over almost every economic activity was delivered with all the enthusiasm of a true believer. As John O'Sullivan stated in the *DAILY TELEGRAPH,* his earlier devotion to free enterprise was clearly a temporary aberration. As Mr. Davies speech only mirrored the rest of the Tory Party's conversion to pure socialism, a renegade's proposal for noninterference in the economy was soundly defeated in the true Lemming-like manner so consistent with Conservative Party supporters.

The industrial relations debate began with no less than another example of vintage, labour party participation accompanied by a few enthusiastic choruses of "We are equal now." Mr. John Goss wanted not merely profit sharing but the legal control of industry transferred from the shareholders to the workers. Someone might have been moved to ask "Where would the capital come from?" But common sense was not the popular tune for this debate except when two speakers from the floor proposed such radical ideas as cutting benefits to strikers and a crackdown on violent picketing. For a brief moment one could detect a spark of interest and enthusiasm, only to see it die with a rambling, vague speech by Maurice Macmillan, Minister of Employment and Productivity.

Throughout the conference inconsistencies fell from the mouths of the Tory speakers as easily as promises fall from the mouths of politicians at election time. But the debate on inflation attained this distinction more than any other.

Does a substantial increase in the money supply cause inflation? Well . . . yes it does, but . . . no it doesn't. For further divine and inane utterances read on.

Anthony Barber who was annointed only two years ago as Chancellor of the Exchequer states these contradictory beliefs with pontifical assurance: "Control of the money supply and the free play of competition as a solution to Britain's ills would lead to economic stagnation, far greater unemployment and a lower standard of living." He went *on* to say with religious fervour, "This is not a price that I am willing to pay." He accepted that the government proposals to the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the Confederation of British Industry

(CBI) (concerning the freeze) involved interference with market forces, but he argued that, "Rip roaring inflation would play far greater havoc." In a clear reference to Mr. Enoch Powell and his free market followers he said, "that it was time that the Party's latter day laissez-faire liberal theorists, however great their academic achievements, recognized that the Chequers proposals were in the interests of the whole country. To those who complained that what the government has proposed involves some interference with the free play of market forces, I would reply, yes it does. Our job is to stop inflation." He ended by promising a larger share of the cake to everyone, and that the government was being fair to the housewife, the wage earner, to industry and the pensioners. Mr. Barber received a standing ovation and the resolution urging the government to control inflation was carried unanimously.

Mr. Heath's winding-up speech could well be dubbed "left turn at Blackpool." "This conference," he said, "has been a triumph for moderation, decency and good sense. We are not a nation of extremists. We are a nation that believes in firmness and fairness." He talked endlessly of consensus politics and a fair share for all, and when he stated that he hoped to get together with both sides of industry to divide up the national income equally and looked towards a future of continuous dialogue between the TUC and the CBI, they took it not lying down but standing up—giving him a long standing ovation. This achievement was, of course, due to that insidious cloud—loyalty, which hangs over every Tory Party Conference.

As I stood in the entrance to the hall and watched the people pour out, their faces smiling, pleased with what they had achieved in one week at Blackpool, here and there, I noticed a few frowns. I wondered to how many it had occurred that the Industrial Revolution had emerged first in this country and lit the lights of prosperity for the following century. Were they not aware that two years ago they had voted for the return to an era of competition and individualism, and that today they had opened the door to the Corporate State and the right to enslave them?

Pauline Russell

trends

ADVERTISING AND LOWER PRICES

Critics of the free market never seem to tire of repeating the folklore that advertising increases prices by raising product costs. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence to the contrary—that advertising increases competition and lowers prices—continues to accumulate, and can hardly be ignored. Two of the best examples concern prescription drugs and eyeglasses.

Advertising of prescription drug prices is expressly prohibited by law in 37 states. In ten of these states pharmacies may not even advertise the fact that they give discounts. The effect of such laws on drug prices is clear-cut. Prof. Yale Brozen of the University of Chicago has compared the average price of a prescription in California (which has the most restrictive laws) and in the states with the least restrictive laws. Using 1970 data he found that the average California prescription cost $4.95, compared with $3.52 in the near-laissez-faire states.

The laws are beginning to change, however. The Supreme Courts of Florida (1969) and Pennsylvania (1971) have struck down those states' anti-advertising laws, but pharmacy trade groups (which control the state licensing boards) have since had new laws passed regulating the form and content of drug advertising, and have otherwise harassed those pharmacies that advertise. In 17 other states the battle for price advertising has been taken up by the 178-store Osco Drug chain. Osco began posting drug prices *in its stores* (which is *not* legally considered advertising) in Boston and Yakima, Washington, and found overwhelming support from consumers. Beginning in October 1971 it expanded the policy to all 178 stores, only to be assaulted by the coercive power of the State.

The Illinois Board of Pharmacy attempted to suspend Osco's pharmacists' licenses on grounds of "gross immorality," the North Dakota board suspended four Osco licenses (but was overruled by a Federal judge), the Wisconsin and South Dakota boards obtained court orders to remove the signs (but the orders were suspended for fear of Federal Price Commission action), the Iowa board threatened Osco but took no action, and the Idaho and Montana boards accused Osco of violating "anti-loss leader" laws. In addition, members of pharmacy boards at universities advised students not to go to work for Osco.

Still, Osco persisted, finding price competition to be good business. Osco has since been joined by Revco Discount Drug Centers, Pathmark, and several other chains. Osco recently won a suit against the restrictions in Wisconsin, and a Maryland Superior Court has declared that state's price advertising ban to be unconstitutional. Supermarkets General (which operates the Pathmark drug chain) has filed suits to overturn the New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut bans, meanwhile posting prices in all of its stores.

No such legal/economic battles have yet been fought over the ban on advertising eyeglasses, but a new study from the University of Chicago should set the stage. Prof. Lee Benham compared the prices of eyeglasses in states which do and do not ban advertising (both price and non-price, depending on the state) of eyeglasses and eye exams. In North Carolina, which completely bans all advertising, the average price was found to be $50.73. In Texas and the District of Columbia, where there is virtual laissez-faire, the average price was $29.97. Over all the states, Prof. Benham concluded that for eyeglasses alone, "advertising restrictions in this market increase the prices paid by 25% to more than 100%." The source and rationale for eyeglasses advertising restrictions are much the same as in the case of prescription drugs. "Professional" associations of optometrists and opticians are in league with the State to limit competition. It shouldn't take long for enlightened consumerists to pick their next target.

SOURCES:

- "Drug Pricing and the Rx Police State," *CONSUMER REPORTS,* March 1972, p.136.
- "The FTC's Attack on Advertising," Yale Brozen, *INDIVIDUALIST,* Vol. 4, No. 1 (undated), p.9.
- "Prescription Drugs Lose Their Mystique," *BUSINESS WEEK,* 18 December 1971, p.21.
- "Drug-Price Advertising Gathers Steam in Courts, *CONSUMER REPORTS,* March 1973, p.148.

• "The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses," Lee Benham, *JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS,* Vol. 15 (2), October 1972, p. 337. (The *JOURNAL* is published twice a year at the University of Chicago Law School, 1111 E. 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637. $7 per year, $4 per copy. Highly recommended.)

FOR CONSENTING ADULTS ONLY

New advances have been made in recent months in the continuing struggle to remove the nose of the State from people's consensual transactions (e.g. gambling and sex). In New York City the prestigious Fund for the City of New York has recommended the legalization of the numbers game. Citing the results of an extensive study, the Fund's report noted that one out of four New Yorkers plays the numbers, resulting in $600 million of the total $1.7 billion annual illegal gambling gross. In order to drive out organized crime and reduce official corruption, the report concluded that the state legislature should legalize numbers. Wisely, the report cautioned *against* the State seeking to use the numbers game itself for revenue, saying that this would defeat the object of combating crime and corruption.

In Hawaii, meanwhile, "gambling during social events" has just been made legal by the state's newly-adopted penal code. The new code (which never defines "social," leading to prediction of large-scale gambling), goes a long way towards eliminating victimless crimes, in addition to gambling. It changes marijuana possession from a felony to a misdemeanor (and makes possession of two ounces or less a "petty misdemeanor"), allowing first-time arrestees to be released with a warning. The code also virtually eliminates all statutes concerning private sex relations between persons over 14 years of age. (Sexual activity between persons under 14 is legal as long as the persons are within four years of each other in age.) Finally, prostitution has been reduced to a misdemeanor, as has "small-time" promotion of prostitution by cab drivers or hotel clerks (in an obvious concession to the tourist industry).

In Pennsylvania, the State House has adopted a new 200-page criminal code which legalizes premarital and extra-marital sex.

Finally, in the District of Columbia the law against prostitution has been found unconstitutional. The D.C. ordinance did not outlaw prostitution per se, but merely *solicitation.* As the law was enforced, it was applied only to women, not to patrons (except for a short-lived experiment a few years ago). Judge Charles W. Halleck ruled that the law therefore discriminated against women, as well as being an invasion of privacy and a violation of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. In addition, the judge noted that since prostitution itself is not illegal in D.C., solicitation to commit a noncriminal act cannot be held criminal. This is the case despite the fact that fornication, sodomy, or adultery might result from the solicitation, because the laws prohibiting the latter forms of conduct are an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy.

SOURCES:
• "New York Report Suggests Gambling Be Legalized," AP (New York), 26 November 1972.
• "Hawaii Social Gambling Law Takes Effect," UPI (Honolulu), 20 January 1973.
• *CRIME CONTROL DIGEST,* 26 January 1973, p.6.
• *CRIME CONTROL DIGEST,* 8 December 1972, p. 4.
• *CRIME CONTROL DIGEST,* 10 November 1972, p.2.

IRS QUOTAS EXPOSED

Last year opponents of coercive taxation cheered when Mr. and Mrs. Phil Long of Bellevue, Washington won a court battle with the IRS. Under the 1967 Freedom of Information Act, the court ruled that the IRS must make available to taxpayers their internal manuals and procedures. After having gone over some of the released materials, the Longs have informed the Senate appropriations subcommittee (which oversees the IRS budget) that the IRS uses a quota system in conducting audits. The 1972 plan, they said, called for office audits to produce $68 to $71 additional tax, on the average, for taxpayers earning under $10,000. For those between $10,000 and $30,000, each audit should produce an average of $926 in extra taxes. Similar quotas exist for businesses and other taxpayer categories.

The Longs' charges were supported by testimony from Vincent Connery, himself an IRS employee and president of a union representing 35,000 IRS personnel. Connery said he was told he must "produce X number of dollars" per audit and would be "in trouble" if he found no errors in the returns he audited. Agents in IRS training are told that "the presumption is that the taxpayer has cheated and the only question is to figure out how much more he owes the government."

The IRS, typically, denied the existence of any quota system.

SOURCE:
• "IRS Has Quota System, Senate Inquiry Told," UPI (Washington), 1 March 1973.

publisher's notes

• SPECIAL BONUS FOR SUBSCRIBERS: This month's extra-length Special Issue contains 48 pages, and features an unprecedented combination of leading libertarian contributors. The newsstand price for Special Issues—which are published twice annually—is $1.50. Subscribers receive *REASON's* Special Issues at no extra charge.

• NEW REASON STAFFER: *REASON's* newest foreign correspondent, Pauline Russell, reports this month from England. Ms. Russell is director of the Free Market Research Institute and operates the popular Transatlantic Success restaurant in Kingston-on-Thames. She is a UCLA economics graduate and is one of England's most effective advocates of laissez-faire capitalism.

• FACULTY REGISTRY PROJECT: *REASON* has compiled a tentative listing of more than 100 college and university faculty members who teach courses of interest to students interested in libertarianism. The list is still growing, and will be published in a future issue.

• REASON ASSOCIATES PROGRESS REPORT: One of the major aims of Reason Associates is to provide "risk capital" for expanding *REASON's* circulation beyond the libertarian movement. The first step in this direction has been taken with the placing of classified ads for *REASON* in three publications: *PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, MS.,* and *SOCIETY* (formerly *TRANS-ACTION*). Additional ads will soon be placed in the *NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS* and *NATIONAL REVIEW.* Depending on the response to these ads, additional classified ads may be placed in other such periodicals. In addition, the relative response rates will help to determine which publications appear to offer the most fertile ground for possible future display ads.

(continued on p. 40)

editorial: On Beginning Reason's 5th Year

Have Your Friends Subscribe, Too

This issue, Volume 5, Number 1, inaugurates *REASON's* fifth publishing year. It seems appropriate at this point to share with our readers some thoughts on what *REASON* has accomplished thus far, and what lies ahead.

First of all, Reason Enterprises has now largely achieved its initial goal of several years ago—namely, that of building *REASON* into the country's major libertarian publication. We have come a long way since *REASON's* first mimeographed 8-page issue in the Spring of 1968. With the absorption of nearly 1000 subscribers from SIL and *INDIVIDUALIST* (as announced last month), *REASON* has now achieved a paid circulation of over 6000. It was only last December that Murray Rothbard pessimistically concluded that "no libertarian periodical, regardless of promotion, advertising, layout, or whatever . . . has been able to get its circulation above two or three thousand." On that basis, Rothbard sadly noted that "there seems no real warrant for gauging the [libertarian] movement at more than 3000."

We are delighted to be able to prove Dr. Rothbard's pessimism premature. In addition to building a circulation base of 6000, *REASON* has developed as a major marketplace for reaching people concerned about freedom. As Dave Nolan of the Libertarian Party recently stated, "When you place an insertion order for an ad in *REASON*, you know it will get published when it's supposed to." In short, *REASON* has established a reputation for regular on-time publishing not previously seen in the libertarian movement.

What does all this imply for libertarianism? Looking first at the movement itself, it means that there is finally a "real" magazine that reaches virtually all active libertarians on a regular basis, to provide intellectual ammunition, to advance the state-of-the-art of libertarian ideas, to provide a forum for open discussion of both major issues and of strategy and tactics for freeing our culture, and to provide a marketplace for products and services of interest to people in the forefront of the battle for liberty. Looking outward, it means that there is now a reliable, professionally-written and produced publication available for introducing libertarian ideas into our culture: via homes, offices, libraries, etc. The editors consciously select a mix of material for *REASON,* so that as much of it as possible will be relevant to the reader just encountering the libertarian philosophy, while not boring the more experienced reader. And, as exemplified by this month's contents, we also strive to include articles representing different facets of the diverse libertarian movement, rather than pushing any single viewpoint. The result is a magazine that is read by an average of two nonsubscribers for every paid subscriber.

All of which is well and good. *REASON's* success has not, however, been costless. Despite our best efforts, *REASON* remains a long way from being profitable, at the 6000-circulation level. This circulation is still a very small base over which to spread the large costs of magazine production. And *REASON* is only now beginning to approach the point where regular (i.e. nonmovement) advertisers will start to take it seriously. (Most magazines make a large portion of their income from advertising; only 6% of *REASON's* 1972 income resulted from ads.) Each increment of circulation brings with it new elements of workload, and continually-rising fulfillment costs. Inflation and rising postal rates also take their toll.

We are not, of course, just sitting back and complaining. An extensive effort to attract advertisers, based on our new circulation base, has just begun, under the direction of Advertising Manager Donna Rasnake. A major increase in ad revenue will enable us to avoid raising subscription prices again, something we would much prefer to avoid. Readers can help in this effort by patronizing our advertisers and letting them know you saw their ad in *REASON.* We are continuing to carry out expensive, time-consuming direct-mail promotional test-mailings in order to find lists of potential subscribers to mail to. We are also hoping to increase our circulation with the help of the Society for Individual Liberty and the Libertarian Party. Finally, we have established Reason Associates as a means by which subscribers and friends can assist us in amassing capital for promotion of *REASON* well beyond the confines of the libertarian movement. The first phase of this promotion is now under way (see Publisher's Notes), with the placement of classified ads for *REASON* in several major periodicals. As more funds become available, we plan to run larger display ads as well.

There is one final resource left untapped, possibly the most valuable of all sources of new subscribers: our current loyal readership. It is exciting for us to ponder that if *every* subscriber gave a gift subscription to just *one* of the people who now read his/her issue, *REASON* would jump to 12,000 circulation. *REASON* would then be assured substantial advertising, the magazine could further expand in size and features (since unit costs per subscriber would decline), *and* it would very likely move into the black.

What does *REASON's* growth mean to you? The more subscribers *REASON* has, the bigger and better *REASON* can become, and the more influence it can have in spreading libertarian ideas.

We'd like very much to see this happen during *REASON's* fifth year. We also think our readers would also like to see it happen, and we'd like to make it worth your while to help us make it happen. Therefore, **every subscriber who gives a gift subscription during 1973 will get a free three-month extension of their own subscription.** Give *two* gifts and get a *six-month* extension, *four* gifts for a *12-month* extension, etc. Help us make 1973 the year of *REASON.*

ROBERT POOLE, JR.
MANUEL S. KLAUSNER

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reason profile

One of the newest concepts in libertarian thought, and one that threatens to make much of the debate between governmentalists and anarchists beside the point, is that of the proprietary community in which the owner/landlord provides for his voluntarily affiliated tenants many or all of the services traditionally provided by government. Building on the ideas his grandfather, Spencer Heath, advanced in *CITADEL, MARKET, AND ALTAR* and those of Ebenezer Howard, garden cities originator (see *REASON*'s cities issue, April 1972) Spencer Heath MacCallum has devoted much of his professional career as an anthropologist to research and promotion of theoretical and applied aspects of proprietary community development.

Born in 1931, Mr. MacCallum developed an interest in anthropology early—at age 12, while living with his parents in Mexico, he regularly assisted archeologists in their work and was responsible for discovering a valuable fresco at Teotihuacan. Back in the States he attended Phillips Academy and Princeton University, receiving his B.A. in 1955. He took his M.A. from the University of Washington in 1961 with a thesis on the proprietary community and completed the residence and course requirements for a Ph.D. in anthropology at the University of Chicago.

He has consulted professionally for such entities as the William Volker Fund (on the possibility of private urban renewal), UCLA Department of Economics, and the Real Estate Research Corporation. His major professional affiliation for several years has been with Alvin Lowi, Jr. in Terraqua, Ltd., a libertarian venture specializing in water treatment technology and energy management oriented towards community utility systems. In addition, Mr. MacCallum administers the Heather Foundation, consisting of the intellectual estates of Spencer Heath and E. C. Riegel (devoted mainly to the proprietary community concept), and is also director of The Registry of Ethnologic Art (Box 48, San Pedro, CA 90733) which provides valuable services to scholars and collectors. Mr. MacCallum is the author of *THE ART OF COMMUNITY* and has published articles in various professional journals.



SPENCER MACCALLUM

His other interests include collecting Northwest Coast Indian art, travel, jogging, health foods, and etymological research. He's fond of animals, and his constant companion (and virtual trademark) is Girl, a semi-Great Dane he rescued from a freeway several years ago.

(continued from p. 37)

• **MINERVA NEWS:** The president of the laissez-faire Republic of Minerva, Morris C. Davis, has been removed from office by vote of the other three officers (vice president Richard King, secretary of state Ralph McMullen, and secretary of interior Dr. David Williams). The reason for the action has not been announced, but *REASON* has learned that it stems from Davis' unauthorized actions in issuing shipping licenses, issuing coinage, and making arrangements (including financial commitments) with International Maritime Legal Research for an "occupation" force. The government of Minerva has repudiated the occupation project, as has Mike Oliver, author of *A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR A NEW COUNTRY,* and originator of the new-country project. "As far as I'm concerned, this project with Minerva is dead," Oliver told *REASON* in March.

The fate of the project is uncertain, as Davis (along with Oliver and the other government officers) is still on the board of Caribbean-Pacific, the company which owns the Minerva Reefs. Majority interest in the company was recently purchased by one Roger Adair, whose plans are at this point unknown. Meantime, International Maritime has announced its intention to proceed with the planned occupation of the reefs. And *BARRONS,* the financial weekly, has assigned reporter Peter DuBois to investigate the whole project.

• **SAN DIEGO UPDATE:** *REASON* has previously reported on developments in the trial of the San Diego Ten, a group of individuals protesting current IRS tax collection tactics. All ten were convicted in federal court last December of various charges stemming from a San Diego demonstration protesting the seizure by the IRS of property for non-payment of taxes. The federal district judge rejected all motions for a new trial except for Hank Hohenstein's. Late word received indicates that the U.S. Attorney's office will dismiss charges against Hohenstein prior to the date set for his new trial. Chris Bates was given six months probation and a $50.00 fine. All convictions will be appealed.

Readers support of the two libertarian defendants has been greatly appreciated. Additional funds are still needed to finance the appeal and retire the remaining expenses of the initial trial. Contributions may be sent to Libertarian Defense and Education Fund, Suite K, 2550 Via Tejon, Palos Verdes Estates, Ca. 90274.

• **DIVERT YOUR TAX:** Persons filing federal income tax returns this April may wish to divert $1 of their *tax* ($2 if filing jointly) *away* from the government and into the coffers of the Libertarian Party. You can do this by using Form 4875, included with your tax return. Simply write in "Libertarian Party" in the blank provided, and the IRS will subtract the $1 or $2 from your tax, and—subject to government red tape—the IRS should send it to national LP headquarters. It

(continued on p. 44)

COMPULSORY EDUCATION

Compulsory education has come under increasing fire from the "educational establishment" as well as the critics on the "fringe." Disciplinary problems–what to do with the uncontrollable students–is no doubt the reason for groups such as NEA to question the compulsory attendance laws. Those critics outside of the education establishment have numerous and various reasons for their attacks. The Center for Independent Education offers the following publications on this subject:

Arons, Stephen, "Compulsory Education–The Plain People Resist." *The Saturday Review,* 15 January 1972, pp. 52-57. (10¢)

Stephen Arons, a practicing attorney, considers the Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v. Yoder. Admittedly the legal question is the quite narrow one of religious freedom. Mr. Arons claims that the case, despite the narrowness of the legal decision, does call into question the entire rationale for compulsory schooling.

It State-compelled attendance is to be conceded, the State must justify its infringement of First Amendment Rights. Mr. Arons, in pointing to the contests which arise between the State and the parent, quotes John Stuart Mill:

> A general state education is a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly like one another; and as the mold in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government–whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation–in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body.

West, E. G. "The Political Economy of American Public School Legislation." *The Journal of Law and Economics 10* (1967): 101-128. (25¢)

Professor West gives an account of the dual consideration of compulsory payment and compulsory consumption legislation as it evolved in New York during the nineteenth century.

Dr. West points out that, until the free school campaign got underway in 1840, it seems to have been readily acknowledged that education could continue to be universal without being free and without compulsion. (For documentation, West cites the Superintendent's reports of the 1830's, particularly the 1836 report). In 1866, the year before the abolition of the rate bills (fees to the parents who were required to pay in proportion to the attendance of their children) in New York, education continued to be almost universal, although not yet compulsory.

West maintains that "the final link in the process of monopolizing education" occurred in New York with the passage of the Compulsory Education Act in 1874.

Rothbard, Murray N. *Education, Free and Compulsory.* Wichita, Kansas: Center for Independent Education, 1972. ($1.00)

In this essay, Dr. Rothbard surveys the history of compulsory education in Europe and America and traces the influence of European educators on the development of education in America.

He points out that education has historically been a tool of either religion or the state. When religious leaders have been in control of education, education has adopted the goal of molding "good men." When the state has controlled education without religious influence, molding "obedient citizens" has been its goal. The author contends that in either case the individual's growth and development are denied.

Rothbard asserts that the "key issue is simply this: shall the parent or the state be the overseer of the child? . . . There is no middle ground in this issue. The one or the other must exercise ultimate control, and no third party with authority to seize the child and rear it has ever been found."

Professor Rothbard also discusses the importance of realizing the unique and individual character of the learner. "The lack of equality–in tastes, ability and character–is not necessarily an invidious distinction, it simply reflects the scope of human diversity. Enthusiasm for equality should actually be viewed as anti-human. It tends to repress the flowering of individual personality and diversity, and indeed, of civilization itself . . ."

Compulsory Education Bibliography. Center for Independent Education. (10¢)

This brief bibliography is not intended to annotate all criticism of compulsory education. It sees criticisms as taking two forms, a proliferation of attacks on the effects of compulsory education and a few challenges on the concept itself. The latter is our concern here.

As a third in a series of topical bibliographies, the Center offers a review of a few substantive articles about compulsory education.

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letters

VAN BUREN THE BEST?

As an admirer of Murray Rothbard I was shocked by his statement in the February issue of *REASON* that Martin Van Buren was probably the best American President. As the first of the political bosses and the head of the infamous Albany Regency, Van Buren and scandal kept very close company throughout his career. Van Buren was a professional politician who was only too glad to relieve the taxpayers of funds in order to increase his own wealth and power.

Van Buren's support of hard money was not based on a conviction that banks should be liberated from government control. Van Buren believed that the state banks should be free from Federal control. More specifically, he believed that the Wall Street banks which supported the power plays of the Albany Regency should become able to manipulate the American economy in place of the Philadelphia central bank, the Bank of the United States. His refusal to intervene in the Panic of 1837 was not based on libertarian motivation but rather an unwillingness to harm the interests of the New York bankers.

The libertarian would do well to remember that statism is statism regardless of the level of government involved. It is hardly libertarian for Wall Street businessmen to create special privileges in the state of New York and then attempt to expand their state banking monopoly. Martin Van Buren's guiding principle was political power. Modern statist historians (especially Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in *THE AGE OF JACKSON*) have apparently succeeded in reviving the reputations of major Jacksonian figures, including Martin Van Buren. I confess my surprise, however, that Murray Rothbard would have accepted their mythology.

It is commendable that we try to look for figures in the past who have behaved with dignity in the fight against big government. It would be mistaken, however, to idolize unprincipled political hacks of whom Martin Van Buren is a prominent example.

Gary Golding
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA

Martin Van Buren

DR. ROTHBARD replies: If the major objection to our rather controversial interview is the question of Martin Van Buren the libertarian movement is indeed in great shape. More seriously, I was of course assessing Van Buren within the context of the office of the Presidency and of the American political system. Within that context, it is curious to attack Van Buren for being a "professional politician."

Van Buren was, to be sure, a shrewd political boss, but it must be realized that, given the political situation of his day, Van's creation of the modern political party system—through his creation of the Democratic Party—was a major achievement for liberty. After the War of 1812, America suffered under literal one-party rule of the Monroe Administration, a rule, furthermore, that was Federalist-statist to the core, having adopted what was for that day big government, high taxes, internal improvements, a governmental central bank, high tariffs, the basic Federalist program. Political disputes were only personal factions within the ruling oligarchy. It was in this dismal context that Martin Van Buren, a personal boss but with libertarian-Jeffersonian inclinations, paid a weekend visit to the aging Jefferson at Monticello in May 1824 that changed his entire life. It was Jefferson who pointed out to Van Buren the Tory nature of the one-party Monroe regime, and it was under Jefferson's inspiration that Van Buren set out to create, almost *de novo,* the Democratic Party as a libertarian opposition: to recreate lost Jeffersonianism. He did it in alliance with Senator Benton of Missouri, similarly inspired by Jefferson, and with Thomas Ritchie, the "old school" Jeffersonian from Virginia, and then finding their charismatic leader, Andrew Jackson, and running him for the Presidency. From the libertarian point of view, Van Buren's achievement in creating the Democratic Party was one of the great political events in American history. It is true that Van Buren was not as pure or consistent a libertarian as his "left wing" in New York, William Leggett and the Loco-focos, but then again Van was close enough to them to merit praise.

Neither do I agree that Van Buren and Jackson were simply interested in aiding state banks; they were against all banks, period, as fractional reserve inflationists. The liquidation of the Bank of the United States, was, for the Jacksonians, only the first step in their ultra-hard-money program; this can be seen in Van Buren's final separation of the federal government from the banks by shifting from the "pet banks" to the Independent Treasury system. Frank Gatell has revealed the fallacy in the old "Wall Street bank" interpretation of Van Buren, and James Sharp's excellent *JACKSONIANS VERSUS THE BANKS* shows the determined drive of Van and the Jacksonians for hard money.

Mr. Golding's evocation of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. is pure guilt by association. Schlesinger was pro-Jacksonian, but largely for the wrong reasons. Moreover, most modern statist historians, following Bray Hammond, are solidly anti-Jackson and Van Buren. For the libertarian and Jeffersonian heroism of Van Buren I would refer our readers not to Schlesinger, but to Robert V. Remini's fine work, *MARTIN VAN BUREN AND THE MAKING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY* (1959).

MILITARY ATROCITIES

I would like to comment on the Rothbard-Liggio interview in your February 1973 issue, specifically with regard to Vietnam and the issue of Viet Cong atrocities. While I am in general agreement with Dr. Rothbard's thesis about the need for popular support in a guerrilla type revolution I believe he has made a common factual error in discussing the role of the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War.

Firstly, the Vietnam War was not totally a guerrilla conflict. In fact there were (and still are) large numbers of North Vietnamese Army personnel in South Vietnam. Up until the Tet offensive of 1968 the Viet Cong were pretty much in control

on their side. But they lost a great number of their key leaders in that offensive and I believe at that point the North Vietnamese took over the brunt of the conflict. As a Vietnam veteran I was stationed in the northern provinces of South Vietnam and we saw plenty of North Vietnamese soldiers but very few Viet Cong. This was even prior to the Tet offensive.

These North Vietnamese not being indigenous to the area they were fighting in, treated the local peasants with no more or less tolerance than any other invading army would (including the U.S.). Often they coerced local peasants into giving them assistance, sometimes to the point of inflicting death if cooperation was not forthcoming. As Dr. Rothbard correctly points out however, the Viet Cong *are* the local people and could not afford to alienate other locals.

As to the Hue atrocities by the Viet Cong, I have read several independent accounts confirming that in fact these atrocities did occur. But again many of them were undoubtedly committed by North Vietnamese, not local Viet Cong. As I said, the North Vietnamese Army operated in the entire area of northernmost South Vietnam in which Hue is located so this is not unlikely. On balance though, it is undoubtedly true that American firepower has resulted in more civilian casualties than both the NVA and Viet Cong combined.

I believe that the above does not contradict Dr. Rothbard's thesis but rather confirms it. Whenever *any* army invades territory foreign to it regard for innocent civilians goes out the window. Even though the North Vietnamese are racially the same and ethnically similar to the South Vietnamese they are still considered by most South Vietnamese as an invading army and therefore act the same as any other invading army has throughout history.

Fred M. Welsh
Verona, PA

"JUST WAR" CRITERIA

I read with interest your interview with Murray Rothbard and Leonard Liggio [*REASON,* February, 1973] and I am disappointed. I find Dr. Rothbard's criteria for a "just war" inadequate because nothing is said about the goals of the warring parties. It seems to me that if individual liberty is worth having, then it is worth fighting to attain and to preserve. A necessary criterion for a "just war" from a libertarian point of view should be that the goal is to attain or preserve liberty.

It is interesting to combine this criterion with the three offered by Dr. Rothbard and analyze the "justness" of each side in the current Southeast Asia conflict. North Vietnam scores zero at the outset . . . they tax, they conscript, they kill innocents, and they seek to impose a governmental system even more abusive of individual liberty and property rights than the wartime Thieu government. Admittedly, our side doesn't score too highly either . . . we tax, we conscript, and we kill innocents. On the fourth criterion, however, I give us just a few points. Though we aren't fighting to preserve a system acceptable to libertarians, we are trying to preserve one in which (during a stable peace) libertarian ideals have a chance to gain acceptance. No evidence to date suggests that the concepts of individual liberty and property rights have any chance at all in a communist nation.

Finally, I was disappointed to see that Dr. Rothbard accepts and is willing to parrot the Viet Cong version of the "Hue massacre". Skepticism of our own press accounts of Hue, or anything else, is understandable. However, acceptance of the official VC version at face value and passing it on to *REASON* readers as truth is inexcusable.

On a more positive note, I am glad that libertarian thinkers are addressing themselves to one of the weakest links in libertarian philosophy . . . foreign policy. I will be looking for more thoughts on the subject on the pages of *REASON.*

Kenneth Strong
Idaho Falls, Idaho

DR. ROTHBARD replies: In the first place, I don't believe that *any* motive can justify aggression. The "Robin Hood" who robs my home or mugs me on the street is just as much an aggressor and a criminal as the man who performs the deed for his own gain.

But to go on to motive: just *whose* "liberty" does Mr. Strong believe the U.S. fought the war to "preserve"? Certainly it is not the liberty of the Vietnamese; the most precious and necessary aspect of anyone's liberty is his right to life, without which any other aspect of his liberty would be meaningless. And yet the U.S. slaughtered literally millions of Vietnamese in its genocidal policies. How about *our* liberty? But this is even more of an absurdity. Does Mr. Strong *really* believe that if we had not waged our slaughter, the Vietnamese would have collected their junks and sampans in the dead of night and launched a sneak invasion of California? Not even the most deluded of Cold War Crusaders could have believed that America was in imminent or even remote danger of a Vietnamese invasion.

So what were the motives? It is easy enough to determine the motives of Hanoi and the National Liberation Front *vis a vis* the United States. They wanted us to get the hell out of their country, and cease to meddle in their affairs. To achieve this result they were willing to make enormous concessions, even refraining from insisting on the immediate freeing of Communist and other oppositionist prisoners from Saigon prison camps—so that perhaps for the first time in the history of cease-fires, *our* prisoners are coming home while *their* prisoners continue to rot in Thieu prisons. The motive, to get the U.S. out of their affairs, is one in which I heartily concur. And what was *our* motive? Certainly one crucial part of that motive was the American desire to push the Vietnamese around, to arrange their affairs, to make sure that they have the kind of government and the kind of society our rulers would like them to have. Until Vietnam, there was scarcely a quarter of the globe where the U.S. did not meddle, interfere, and attempt to dictate the form of government. Let us hope that this clear-cut defeat at the hands of a small, undeveloped but remarkably determined people will teach the U.S. rulers a lesson.

Mr. Strong seems to have fallen into a common conservative and libertarian trap. He is judging war between two states or nations on the basis of the relative merits of their domestic systems. But this is not only incorrect theoretically, it has proven to be wrong time and again in history. Country A may be freer in every way than Country B, and yet Country A may have launched a brutal and unjustifiable war of aggression against the latter.

Finally, the "Viet Cong" is not only capable of telling the truth, it has been remarkably truthful throughout the conflict, especially in contrast to the gigantic fabric of lies committed by the United States (Exhibit A: the Pentagon Papers). ◻

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may be necessary to sue the government for release of the funds allotted to the LP, which makes it important for as many LP supporters to use Form 4875 as possible.

• **DEMSETZ TO SPEAK IN L.A.:** Prominent free-market economist Harold Demsetz of the UCLA Economics Department will address the Libertarian Supper Club of Los Angeles on the first of May. Dr. Demsetz's topic will be concentrated industries and the extent of evidence linking concentration with monopoly. (See "Administered Prices—Fact or Fancy?" *REASON* Trends column, October 1972, p.31) For further information on Dr. Demsetz's talk contact Lloyd Licher, 12536 Woodbine St., Los Angeles, CA 90066.

• **LIBERTARIAN WOMEN'S LIB:** At the National Women's Political Caucus conference in Houston early in February, libertarians were well represented. Nationwide advance preparation (through the efforts of Tonie Nathan, Lynn Kinsky, Clarica Scott, Susan Nolan, and Elizabeth Jacobson) aided local libertarians Georgiann Trammell, Juliane Dollohan, and Robert Tinney in preparing an elaborate booth from which over 1000 pieces of literature were distributed. In addition to copies of *REASON* and various other materials, original articles addressed to feminist issues (written by Sharon Presley, Mike Holmes, and Lonnie Brantley) were distributed. Many media people picked up these materials, and ABC-TV taped several shots of the booth and posters.

• **SIEGAN BOOK WINS AWARD:** Chicago lawyer Bernard Siegan's attack on compulsory zoning *(LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING)* has been awarded the Monks award by the Institute for Humane Studies. The award is presented each year in recognition of distinguished writing in the fields of jurisprudence and political philosophy. Mr. Siegan is the subject of an in-depth interview in the April 1973 issue of *REASON.*

• **LIBERTARIAN PARTY CONVENTION:** The 1973 National Convention of the Libertarian Party will be held June 7th - 9th in Cleveland. Convention space has been reserved at the Holiday Inn, one mile north of the Ohio Turnpike and ten miles from Cleveland-Hopkins Airport.

• **ECONOMIC HISTORY SEMINAR:** The Institute for Humane Studies is sponsoring a seminar at Cornell University on the topic of "New Perspectives in 20th Century American Economic History." The seminar will feature Professors Murray Rothbard and Forrest McDonald, and will take place from June 18th through 28th. Attendance is by invitation only and will be limited to 40 persons. Inquiries should be directed to Professor Leonard Liggio, 2233 Westervelt Ave., Bronx, NY 10469.

• **COMING NEXT MONTH:** *REASON's* June issue will feature a timely and insightful interview with Daniel Ellsberg, presently on trial in federal court in Los Angeles for dissemination of the Pentagon Papers. Also included next month is a significant attack on current FTC policy by University of Chicago economics professor Yale Brozen. Don't miss this important issue—if you are not yet a subscriber, act now!

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RANDALL K HYLKEMA


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PUBLIC INTEREST? THIS CALLS FOR A CONSENSUS!
A POLL: WHERE IN LIES THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
A HAM ON RYE IS MY INTEREST, AND I'M PART OF THE PUBLIC.
LIZARD-SKIN BOOTS
A PHOTON POWERED POGO STICK
PUBLIC INTEREST MEANS BRACES FOR VAUGHN, MY PET PYTHON.
YEZM
GARLIC ICE CREAM, PLASTIC DUBLOONS, ETC., ETC... SO WHAT'S THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
THIS CALLS FOR SOME HEAVY MATHEMATICS!
HAM
RYE
(POGO)
I'VE GOT IT!
A NEW BOTTLE OF VIN ROUGE! TO THE VINTNER!
AHHH! WE DO HAVE AN ENLIGHTENED POPULACE.
HYLKEMA

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

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This the League offers. There aint no instant freedom, but the League claims to know the shortest path.

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The current newsletter discusses

a) how the League helps you protect ideas,
b) League-advised legal defense for income tax, marijuana, and numerous other problems,
c) how the League protects you from dollar devaluations,
d) how the League creates consumer protection,
e) how the League returns ideas in the public domain to private ownership.

For clarity, the newsletter cites these examples

a) how the Amish won the right not to send children to state schools,
b) how General Foods lost millions on MAXIM by idea theft,
c) how Underwriters Laboratories promotes product safety.

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EMPLOYMENT

LIBERTARIAN IN CANADA would like to re-locate in California. Needs job. Male, single, 28. Presently employed by law firm in non-professional capacity. Any offers or suggestions appreciated. D. Finch, 583 Central Ave., #3, London, Ont-Canada.

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PERSONAL

I AM INTERESTED IN CONTACTING PEOPLE (especially living in LA or NYC) who also spend a very large amount of their time involved with Romantic artistic works—particularly Romantic film and/or music. My film favorites include Ninotchka (and other Garbo, Lubitsch, Wilder, Brackett), Love Letters, Cyrano de Bergerac, Scarlet Pimpernel, Philadelphia Story, Holiday (and other Hepburn), Casablanca, many Hitchcock films, Sound of Music, Singing in the Rain (and other Kelly), Midnight, Scream of Fear, High Noon, Miracle Worker. James Coburn films, Astaire. I have a special passion for Rachmaninoff as well as Chopin, Saint Saens and other major classical composers of the Romantic era. I have a special love for operetta music of Lehar, Offenbach, O. Straus, Nilloecker, Fall, Coward, Kalman, Strauss Jr., Stolz, Zellers, etc. In literature my favorites are Rand and O'Henry, and in painting and sculpture—Michelangelo. Please reply to *REASON* Box MM.

LONELY MALE LIBERTARIAN, early 20's, west coast area, quiet, sensitive. Tired of being a "Libertarian anchorite." Would like to meet rational (or even semi-rational) young woman. Please reply *REASON,* Box MW.

MAN, 30, SEEKS essentially healthy (psychologically and physically) Chicago-area women who would like to share interests romantically. Objectivist orientation preferred. Box MA, *REASON.*

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If you have ever been stirred and enlightened by the novels of Ayn Rand, George Orwell or Robert Heinlein, by the rigor and logic of the work in economics of Milton Friedman, Ludwig von Mises, Henry Hazlitt and Murray N. Rothbard, by the biting social commentary of H.L. Mencken and Albert J. Nock, then you owe yourself an introduction to libertarianism.

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An understanding of libertarianism, then, is critical to those who wish to understand how a better world can be built tomorrow. And here we offer the three books which we believe provide the best possible introduction:

LIBERTARIANISM by John Hospers, the distinguished chairman of the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California, provides a comprehensive, but non-technical introduction to the subject. Drawing on such writers as Ayn Rand, Ludwig von Mises and Henry Hazlitt, Hospers integrates the most forceful libertarian arguments into a coherent case ranging in issues from individual rights to international relations, from welfare to ecology. The book is a virtual encyclopedia that deals with almost every objection to a free market and a free society.

RADICAL LIBERTARIANISM: A RIGHT WING ALTERNATIVE by Jerome Tuccille concentrates on the aspect of libertarianism with which he is most familiar: the fragmentation of the American right-wing into two distinct camps, traditionalist conservatives and libertarians. Tuccille presents the essentials of libertarianism more succinctly, but no less persuasively than does Prof. Hospers. And in addition, Tuccille includes an important and interesting history of the initial development of libertarianism as a self-conscious "movement."

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

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

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